Post-apartheid Political Culture In South Africa, 1994-2004 by Kinsell, Andrew
University of Central Florida 
STARS 
Electronic Theses and Dissertations, 2004-2019 
2009 
Post-apartheid Political Culture In South Africa, 1994-2004 
Andrew Kinsell 
University of Central Florida 
 Part of the History Commons 
Find similar works at: https://stars.library.ucf.edu/etd 
University of Central Florida Libraries http://library.ucf.edu 
This Masters Thesis (Open Access) is brought to you for free and open access by STARS. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Electronic Theses and Dissertations, 2004-2019 by an authorized administrator of STARS. For more 
information, please contact STARS@ucf.edu. 
STARS Citation 
Kinsell, Andrew, "Post-apartheid Political Culture In South Africa, 1994-2004" (2009). Electronic Theses 
and Dissertations, 2004-2019. 4084. 
https://stars.library.ucf.edu/etd/4084 
 
 
POST-APARTHEID POLITICAL 
CULTURE IN SOUTH AFRICA 
1994-2004 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
by 
 
 
ANDREW KINSELL 
B.A. University of Central Florida, 2005 
 
 
 
 
 
A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements 
for the degree of Master of Arts 
in the Department of History 
in the College of Arts and Humanities 
at the University of Central Florida 
Orlando, Florida 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Summer Term 2009 
 ii 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
©2009 Andrew Kinsell 
 iii 
ABSTRACT 
 
 Between 1994 and 2004 the African National Congress (ANC) dominated government at 
every level of every branch.  As a result, the checks and balances that are a necessary part of any 
democracy were non-existent.  Understanding the powerful position they occupied, the ANC 
increasingly acted on its own accordance without any regard for the wishes of the South African 
populace.  This lack of public consideration, coupled with the failure to economically 
redistribute wealth among the vast unemployed majority, turned an optimistic political culture 
with mass participation in 1994 into a disillusioned political culture with reduced political 
participation in 2004.  
These economic failures, along with the rise in crime and political corruption that 
dominated South African politics, eroded the optimism and trust that for a short time was 
prevalent in South Africa.  Instead, the post-apartheid political culture of South Africa resembled 
what it did for all of those decades under apartheid: one of disillusionment and non-participation.  
The following thesis will argue that during the decade following 1994, South Africans became 
increasingly frustrated and disillusioned with government as the divide between the small-upper 
class and the large-proletariat continually expanded.  The various explanations for the expansion 
of this divide will be presented along with survey information, which will attempt to garner what 
the South African public perceives to be; 1) the primary threat to the long-term stability of 
democracy, 2) the affectiveness of government between 1994 and 2004.  Most importantly, the 
surveys will ask South Africans who voted in 1994 but not in 2004 the reason for not voting in 
order to fully understand the specific cause for the decline in political participation. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 
 When the first democratic elections were held in South Africa in 1994, the African 
National Congress (ANC) promised that all South African citizens, regardless of their race, 
would have a share in determining both domestic and foreign policy.  By taking this stance the 
ANC directly targeted the vast population of black South Africans who had been severely 
marginalized for over one hundred years.  Indeed, this tactic succeeded as the ANC won the 
1994 election and appointed Nelson Mandela as president, charging him with the responsibility 
to lead the first democratic government.  On 9 May 1994, Nelson Mandela was inaugurated as 
president of South Africa.  It was at this point, during the inauguration speech, he stated that his 
goal was “to create jobs, promote peace and reconciliation, and to guarantee freedom,” while 
ending, “the widespread poverty so pervasive among the majority of our people.”1  The response 
among the majority of South Africa’s black populace was euphoric, to say the least.2
A decade after his momentous speech, few of the promises made by Nelson Mandela and 
the ANC came to fruition.  The minimal accomplishments the ANC made between 1994 and 
2004 focused on economically improving the urban centers with little regard for the outlying 
rural areas.  For instance, in rural areas of KwaZulu-Natal “close to half a million black people 
eke out an existence in shacks and subhuman dwellings within an area of twenty-five square 
 
                                                 
1 Nelson Mandela, “Nelson Mandela’s Address to the People of Cape Town, Grand Parade, on the 
Occasion of his Inauguration as State President,” Presidential Inauguration Speech, 9 May 1994, “African National 
Congress,” www.anc.org, [organization]; http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/mandela/1994/inaugct.html, 
accessed 2 October 2007.  
 
 2 New York Times (New York), 3 May 1994. 
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miles.”3
 Although the ANC has essentially turned its back on the segment of society that won 
them the 1994 election, it did not, and still does not, face a great deal of opposition from the 
black populace.  While this may seem intriguing, the lack of opposition to the ANC can be 
explained relatively easily.  First, by following a conservative and urban industrialization policy 
centered on the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) program, the ANC continued 
to entrench South Africa’s rural populace in poverty.  In turn, this forced the marginalized-black 
majority populace to focus on short term, day-to-day survival, instead of long-term improvement 
via political organization.  Second, the ANC controlled leadership at the local and provincial 
levels through political pressure and acts of floor crossing.
  Thus, despite promising all South Africans equality and a voice in shaping South 
Africa’s future, very little changed during the first decade of democratic rule. 
4
Finally, external and domestic monetary donations made to liberal democratic non-
government organizations (NGO) have given these NGO’s the resources necessary to convince 
some disillusioned South Africans that democracy does not always equate with equality or even 
an improvement in standards of living.
  Specifically, the unification of civic 
associations throughout South Africa enabled the ANC to focus on controlling several key 
leaders instead of numerous individuals from every locality.   
5
                                                 
3 Julian Kunnie, Is Apartheid Really Dead: Pan-Africanist Working Class Cultural Critical Perspectives 
(Oxford: Westview Press, 2000). 
  The indoctrination of this philosophy was a result of the 
combined efforts of individuals both inside and outside of South Africa.  Those inside of South 
Africa, specifically the ANC, its supporters, and the traditionally upper-class elite, rallied around 
 
4 Elke Zuern, “Fighting for Democracy: Popular Organizations and Postapartheid Government in South 
Africa,” African Studies Review 45, no. 1 (April 2002): 97. 
 
5 Julie Hearn, “The ‘Uses and Abuses’ of Civil Society in South Africa,” Review of African Political 
Economy, no. 87 (2001): 48. 
 3 
liberal procedural democracy in order to preserve the current economic structure.  Those outside 
of South Africa, specifically Western nations and capitalistic international corporations invested 
in South Africa, feared a move towards socialism that social democracy and the redistribution of 
wealth might eventually entail.   
I do not mean to suggest that there has not been any resistance to the ANC since 1994, 
quite the contrary.  In the years following the first democratic elections, several political parties 
conveyed their displeasure regarding both the political culture in South Africa and the direction it 
was headed in general.  This opposition to the ANC has grown in recent years as the Inkatha 
Freedom Party (IFP), Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), and the Democratic Alliance (DA), have 
been joined by numerous other parties including the Independent Democrats (ID), which was 
formed in 2003.  Sprinkle in several smaller parties including the African Christian Democratic 
Party (ACDP), the United Christian Democratic Party (UCDP), Freedom Front Plus (FF+), and 
the United Democratic Movement (UDM), among others, and the picture of a convoluted, 
splintered political culture reveals itself.  However these parties, especially the smaller parties 
previously listed, continually struggled to garner an adequate operating budget and the voter 
turnout needed to challenge the ANC due to their impoverished supporter base.6
Without the time, support, or financial capabilities available to them the South African 
populace found it difficult, if not impossible, to organize and legitimately challenge the ANC.
      
7
                                                 
6 Global Integrity, Global Integrity Index (GII), 2004. 
 
What complicates this situation is that the ANC understood that this population did not, and still 
7 Alexander Johnston, “The 1999 Election and South Africa’s Postapartheid Political Culture,” Issue: A 
Journal of Opinion 27, no. 2 (1999). 
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does not, have the means to oppose it.8
 The lack of improvement during the first decade of democracy, coupled with the 
overwhelming political corruption that has dominated South African politics, eroded the 
optimism and trust that for a short time was apparent in South Africa.  Instead between 1994 and 
2004 the post-apartheid political culture resembled what it did for all of those decades under 
apartheid: one of disillusionment and non-participation.
  This understanding emboldened the ANC and convinced 
those within the party that they could govern in whatever manner they wished because there was 
no need to fear their displacement from power.  Hence, not only did the ANC turn its back on the 
aforementioned populations, but also created a political platform that purposefully and 
intentionally neglected them.   
9
 Survey data was gathered from the two largest cities in South Africa, Johannesburg and 
Durban.  Large-urban cities were chosen as distribution sites because they encompass different 
segments of the populace and most affectively represent the diversity of South Africa.  In 
Johannesburg, surveys were distributed in the financial district and surrounding strip malls which 
  This thesis argues that between 1994 
and 2004 the South African political culture saw a steady decline in political participation.  
Specifically, it will also seek to understand the degree to which ANC dominance, crime and 
corruption in government, economic shortcomings, and a lack of shared national identity caused 
the decrease in political participation.  While accomplishing this main goal it will also present 
the various problematic issues that continue to challenge democratic stability in South Africa.  In 
order to accomplish these tasks this thesis will incorporate a wide array of sources including the 
distribution and collection of surveys. 
                                                 
8 Robert Mattes, “South Africa: Democracy Without the People,” Journal of Democracy 13, no. 1 (2002): 
25. 
9 Gretchen Bauer and Scott D. Taylor, Politics in Southern Africa, (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers,  
2005), 239. 
 5 
are areas frequented by individuals from all races and social classes.  In Durban, surveys were 
distributed at the Victoria Street Market and along the city’s beachfront district.  The Victoria 
Street Market was chosen as a distribution site due to its high Indian population and the need to 
include their opinions in the survey data.  The beachfront district was chosen because, much like 
the financial district of Johannesburg, it is frequented by South Africans from all races and social 
classes.  Due to the surveys subject matter and the time constraints of me only being in South 
Africa for 8 days, several hundred surveys were distributed however only 65 surveys met both 
the inclusion criteria and were completed in their entirety within the limited time period.  The 
inclusion criteria required participants to be at least 32 years old and mandated that each 
participant was a citizen of South Africa in 1994.  This age was utilized as a cutoff because it 
was the minimum age an individual could vote in the 1994 election.   
 The survey consisted of thirteen questions which were relegated to the period 1994 to 
2004 and focused on gathering the opinions individuals have regarding the first decade of 
democracy in South Africa.10  This included participants rating improvements, or lack thereof, in 
the economic, political, and healthcare sectors between 1994 and 2004.  Participants were also 
asked to provide what each thought of the ANC led government, along with what they deemed to 
be of most concern to the stability of democracy in South Africa.  Namely these concerns are: 
economic shortcomings (failure to redistribute wealth), crime and corruption, ANC dominated 
government, and lack of nationalism or nationalistic identity.11
                                                 
 10 Because the survey was aimed at gathering information from the South African public as a single entity, 
demographic questions were limited to age and did not include race or gender.  These requirements were mandated 
by the Institutional Review Board (IRB) in order for the survey to gain University approval. 
  Lastly, the surveys asked South 
 
 11 A copy of the survey is included in the appendix. 
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Africans who voted in 1994 but did not vote in 2004 to explain why they did not vote in order to 
understand why there was a decline in political participation.   
Furthermore, this thesis also utilizes United Nations Development Program (UNDP), 
World Bank, and World Health Organization (WHO) reports, the Human Development Index 
(HDI), the Global Integrity Index (GII), the Corruption Perception Index (CPI), the Global 
Corruption Barometer (GCB), election polling results, and newspaper articles.  UNDP, World 
Bank, and WHO reports will be used to chart the improvement, or lack thereof, in the economic, 
education, and healthcare sectors.  Election results from the Independent Electoral Commission 
(IEC) of South Africa will be presented to show voter turnout and the varying levels of political 
participation in South Africa between 1994 and 2004.  The GII and CPI will be used to present 
how researchers and journalists in South Africa viewed the South African political construct, 
along with the GCB, which will be used to present how the South African populace viewed 
crime and corruption in politics.  Finally, newspaper articles will be used to buttress the survey 
data and to provide additional insight into how the South African populace viewed and continues 
to view its government.  These sources, along with the GCB, are especially informative as one of 
the key components in a political culture is the way a given populace perceives, feels, and relates 
with its government. 
 
Literature Review 
  
While there has been an increase in scholarship conducted on post-apartheid South Africa 
in recent years, many of these studies have focused on social and economic aspects of South 
African society.  This is not to suggest that there have not been significant post-apartheid 
 7 
political studies, quite the contrary.  However, there has been a tendency for these political 
studies to focus on the various challenges inherent in South Africa by tracing back several 
hundred years.  In the midst of providing this background information the analysis spent on the 
post-apartheid political era becomes somewhat constrained.  Indeed to date there are few studies 
published since the second election that focus solely on some aspect of the post-apartheid 
political culture in South Africa.  Literature written prior to the second election was excluded as 
the extent to which the post-apartheid political culture could be evaluated compromises their 
accuracy.  Political scholarship that analyzes and evaluates the post-apartheid political culture 
will be presented in the following literature review.  Respectively these publications are: “The 
1999 Election and South Africa’s Post apartheid Political Culture”, “South Africa: Democracy 
Without the People”, “Fighting for Democracy: Popular Organizations and Postapartheid 
Government in South Africa”, “Aiding Democracy? Donors and Civil Society in South Africa”, 
“The ‘Uses and Abuses’ of Civil Society in Africa”, Politics and Society in South Africa, Politics 
in Southern Africa, and Fault-Lines in South African Democracy.   
 As previously mentioned, the historiography that solely focuses on South Africa’s post- 
apartheid political culture after the second election is somewhat limited.  One of the first 
publications written after the second election is an article written by Alexander Johnston entitled 
“The 1999 Election and South Africa’s postapartheid Political Culture” (1999).  Johnston begins 
this article by stating his belief that democracy has been consolidated in South Africa and overall 
the process has been a relatively smooth one.  To support this perspective he points to the 1999 
election, which was conducted without large-scale opposition and with the results being 
overwhelmingly in favor of the ANC.  That said, he does point to some problems with the 
political culture and the direction it is headed in general.  Specifically, Johnston argues that the 
 8 
ANC has been limited to the extent that they could advocate nationalism because of the fear that 
nationalistic appeals would not garner support from neo-nationalist and post-nationalist 
individuals.  He emphasizes that because of this lack of nationalistic rhetoric, the South African 
political culture does not have a nationalistic or unified identity.  Instead, he concludes that it is 
actually more fragmented than it was in 1994.  Another main problem that Johnston argues has 
plagued the South African political culture regards the inability for the ANC to make difficult 
decisions.  He notes that since taking over in 1994, the ANC has continually followed a policy of 
compromise and has avoided or delayed making difficult decisions.12
For instance, Johnston points out that the ANC has been unwilling to alter the 
government’s position on organized labor versus mass job creation for the unemployed because 
of the formers role during the years of apartheid.  Elaborating on this point Johnston states that 
the “political costs of long-term unemployment have been more acceptable than the risk of 
upheaval from any disruption to government’s relationship with organized labor.”
   
13
 In Politics and Society in South Africa (2001) Daryl Glaser discusses the process by 
which racial and class order was constructed in South Africa.  He accomplishes this task by 
explaining the various tactics through which the Afrikaner populace splintered the non-white 
  In other 
words, Johnston believes that the ANC has decided that protecting its own legitimacy, both 
presently and in the future, is more important than addressing the most pressing national issue; 
mass unemployment.  He argues that by taking this self-serving stance the ANC has created a 
political culture of citizens who lack moral cohesion, a common purpose, and a nationalistic or 
unified identity.     
                                                 
12 Alexander Johnston, “The 1999 Election and South Africa’s Postapartheid Political Culture,” 23. 
 
13 Johnston, “The 1999 Election,” 20. 
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populace into ethnic and racial sects.  The intention of this explanation is to present a society 
that, entering into the 1994 election, was and had been split along racial, class, and ethnic lines 
for several decades.  He concludes that identifying the differences between classes in particular 
could assist the struggle for a non-racial and classless society.14
 Glaser begins his discussion of the post-apartheid political culture by pointing out the 
several conditions he believes are necessary in order for a society to become democratized.  
Namely these requirements are that a political culture must have: democratic experience, an 
alterable public opinion, crosscutting of social cleavages, and widely shared values and 
identities.
  While the background 
information provided by Glaser is useful for those both unfamiliar and familiar with South 
African history, it is the final sections on the post-apartheid political culture that is of particular 
interest. 
15
 Contrastingly, Elke Zuern argues that the corruption and ineffective governance set forth 
by local governments is not a result of the autonomy that they receive from the ANC but rather a 
lack thereof.  In his article entitled “Fighting for Democracy” (2002), Zuern points out that once 
   Glaser believes that, to a certain degree, the post-apartheid political culture has 
fulfilled all of these requirements and that democratic consolidation has taken place.  
Furthermore, he believes the main problems with the post-apartheid political culture, non-
participation and disillusionment, stem from the widespread crime and corruption that dominates 
the South African landscape.  It is a point of interest that Glaser argues that corruption comes not 
from the ANC but from the local governments and is a result of the autonomy they receive from 
the central organization of the ANC.   
                                                 
14 Daryl Glaser, Politics and Society in South Africa (London: Sage Publications, 2001), 111.  
 
15 Glaser, Politics and Society, 216. 
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the ANC ascended to power they unified the numerous independent civic associations under one 
organization named the South African National Civic Organization (Sanco).16
 Zuern goes on to stress that the dominance of the ANC, and the collusion between the 
ANC and Sanco, at both the local and national level, has disillusioned the rural black populace 
and has made participation in government and politics challenging for the common individual.
  By combining 
these associations it was easier for the ANC to affectively control the grassroots leadership while 
also securing the support of the rural black majority.  Furthermore, with the leaders of Sanco 
under their control the ANC was able to continually garner electoral support despite enacting 
legislature, such as GEAR, that failed to assist this voter base. 
17  
He argues that this lack of participation and disillusionment in the ANC is the most troubling 
aspect of the post-apartheid political culture as it was this very grassroots segment of South 
African society that assisted the ANC and the anti-apartheid movement. However, while Zuern 
believes the ANC has failed to uphold many of its promises he argues that democratic 
consolidation has taken place in South Africa.  That said, he emphasizes that the long-term 
success of this democracy rests on the ability for the ANC to appeal and relate with the whole 
South African populace.18
 Although the unification of civic associations under Sanco allowed the ANC to concert 
their efforts on fewer individuals, it was, and has been, the promotion of procedural democracy 
by NGO’s and civil society organizations (CSO) that has, and continues to, quell widespread 
protest.  Julie Hearn argues in “The ‘Uses and Abuses’ of Civil Society in Africa” that civil 
  
                                                 
16 Elke Zuern, “Fighting for Democracy: Popular Organizations and Postapartheid Government in South 
Africa,” 83.  
 
17 Zuern, “Fighting for Democracy,” 83. 
 
18 Zuern, “Fighting for Democracy,” 81. 
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society must be autonomous and should not be manipulated by the government or used to 
stabilize its position.19
She notes that since 1994, the NGO’s and CSO’s who receive by far the most funding are 
advocates of procedural democracy, which the ANC has continued to adhere to, instead of social 
democracy, which was the platform the ANC initially promised to follow.
  However, it is in her article “Aiding Democracy? Donors and Civil 
Society in South Africa,” where Hearn focuses specifically on South Africa and the process by 
which, and ramifications of, a populace that has been manipulated by NGO’s and CSO’s.   
20  These organizations 
include the Institute for Multiparty Democracy, Idasa, and the South African Institute for Race 
Relations; all of which have received several million dollars from the United States Agency for 
International Development (USAID).  Hearn points out that because the South African civil 
society has been indoctrinated by these well-funded NGO’s and CGO’s, the ANC has retained 
support among the South African voter base.  Resultantly, the government has not faced 
widespread opposition despite preserving the same exploitative apartheid era economic system 
the ANC assured would change.21
 Regarding democratic consolidation, Hearn believes that democracy has been 
successfully emplaced but it is not the democracy the ANC had initially promised to instill.  And 
while liberal NGO’s and CSO’s have successfully altered the mindset of many individuals, half 
of the South African populace continues to equate democracy with economic improvement made 
possible via social democracy.  That said, although the divide over what form of democracy to 
practice is troubling, even more concerning is the fact that “autonomous social forces are more 
 
                                                 
19 Julie Hearn, “The ‘Uses and Abuses’ of Civil Society in Africa,” 44.  
 
20 Julie Hearn, “Aiding Democracy? Donors and Civil Society in South Africa,” Third World Quarterly 21, 
no. 5 (Oct. 2000): 826. 
 
21 Hearn, “Aiding Democracy?,” 829. 
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urgently needed than ever before,” but “are as absent as never before”.22
 Bolstering the argument that democratic consolidation has taken place in post-apartheid 
South Africa is Fault-Lines in South African Democracy (2003), by Fred Hendricks.  Hendricks 
agrees with Johnston and Glaser that democracy has been instilled in South Africa but that it has 
not been carried over into the economic realm.  Specifically, he argues that all South Africans 
regardless of race or class have freedoms of speech, religion, and organization but do not have 
equality in employment, education, and land ownership.
  From this statement it 
can be deduced that Hearn believes the most threatening aspect to the stability of the post-
apartheid political culture is the dominance by the ANC, particularly over civil society.   
23  For instance, in a 1998 report released 
by the Inter-Ministerial Committee for Poverty and Inequality, 61% of black South Africans 
lived in poverty while only 1% of white South Africans were impoverished.  He concludes that 
these economic disparities, along with the lack of persistence by the government to address these 
shortcomings, are the main obstacles in the way of the successful continuation of a democratic 
political culture.24
In contrast to scholars such as Johnston, Glaser, Zuern, and Hendricks, Robert Mattes 
does not believe democratic consolidation has taken place in post-apartheid South Africa.  In his 
article entitled “South Africa: Democracy Without the People?” (2002), Mattes argues that South 
Africans are not fully behind the democratic government which is apparent as there has been a 
decrease in political participation.
   
25
                                                 
22 Julie Hearn, “The ‘Uses and Abuses’ of Civil Society in Africa,” 52. 
  He notes that this is due to several reasons including the fact 
 
23 Fred Hendricks, Fault-Lines in South African Democracy: Continuing Crises of Inequality and Injustice, 
(Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 2003), 9. 
 
24 Hendricks, Fault-Lines, 28. 
 
25 Robert Mattes, “South Africa: Democracy Without the People?,” 23. 
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that over 500,000 jobs have been lost since 1995 and that economic growth has been at 3% 
annum despite requiring 6-7% annum in order to cut unemployment and reduce inequality.26  
More importantly these economic shortcomings are coupled by political domination by the ANC.  
For instance, amendments made to the constitution since 1994 have enabled the ANC to 
determine the makeup of provincial governments and designate local mayoralties.  Furthermore, 
any checks made by oversight committees on the ANC have resulted in alienation from party 
lines and expulsion, such as in the case of Bantu Holomisa.27
Mattes argues that because a political culture is shaped by both political and economic 
trends, support for the government is fleeting.  Indeed, “the web of organizations and the 
impressive tradition of popular participation that emerged to challenge the apartheid systems 
have withered.”
 
28  This loss of trust and participation is much more concerning than the lack of a 
national identity.  Indeed, Mattes points towards polls conducted since 1995 that show that there 
is an agreement among the populace of the presence of a common identity that overcomes 
economic and racial divides.29
                                                                                                                                                             
 
  Yet again this is in contrast to the theories disseminated by 
scholars such as Johnston and Glaser.  In other words, Mattes believes that the most concerning 
issue regarding the post-apartheid political culture is the manner in which the ANC has governed 
rather than the question of nationalism or the problems of crime and corruption.  
26 Mattes, “South Africa: Democracy,” 23. 
 
27 Mattes, “South Africa: Democracy,” 25. 
 
28 Mattes, “South Africa: Democracy,” 29. 
 
29 Mattes, “South Africa: Democracy,” 29. 
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 In congruence with Mattes, Gretchen Bauer and Scott Taylor also argue that democratic 
consolidation has not taken place in South Africa since 1994.30  In Politics in South Africa 
(2005), they argue that the ANC has emplaced a one-party government much like the apartheid-
era system and have consolidated power at every level of government.  One example of this 
dominance is their direct defiance of the South African populace’s wishes.  For instance, Bauer 
and Taylor point out the passing of legislation that legalized floor crossing by the Constitutional 
Court in 2003.  Despite a three to one popular vote opposing the legalization of floor crossing, 
the court passed the legislation, which promptly gave the ANC nine new members in Parliament 
and an overall majority in the National Assembly.31  Bauer and Taylor believe that this 
reluctance to abide to the people’s wishes, along with the lack of economic and social 
improvements, is the main cause of the disillusionment that has run rampant in the political 
culture of South Africa.  Also like Mattes, Bauer and Taylor believe that while there is a lack of 
nationalistic identity in South Africa the most pressing concern in the political culture is ANC 
dominance and the resulting disillusionment of the populace to their so-called democratic 
government.32
 Summarily, scholarship on the first decade of the post-apartheid political culture can be 
separated along two distinct lines: the question of democratic consolidation and the ongoing 
debate regarding which factor is the primary concern to the long-term stability of democracy.  
Those scholars who believe democratic consolidation has occurred include but are not limited to 
Fred Hendricks, Alexander Johnston, Elke Zuern, Julie Hearn, and Daryl Glaser.  On the 
 
                                                 
30 Bauer and Taylor, Politics in Southern Africa, 258. 
 
31 Bauer and Taylor, Politics in Southern Africa, 260. 
 
32 Bauer and Taylor, Politics in Southern Africa, 274. 
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opposite side of the aisle are scholars such as Robert Mattes, Scott Taylor, and Gretchen Bauer.  
The second determinant, what is the primary concern to the long-term stability of democracy, is 
harder to delineate.  Respectively the primary concerns are: the lack of nationalism or 
nationalistic identity (Johnston), one-party dominance by the ANC (Bauer, Taylor, Mattes, 
Zuern, and Hearn), crime and corruption (Glaser), and economic shortcomings (Hendricks).  
That said there is an agreement among scholars that the post-apartheid political culture has seen 
an ever-enlarging segment of the population that is disillusioned to the point of non-participation.  
This is undoubtedly the biggest concern of all involved and understanding the cause of the 
decline in political participation between 1994 and 2004 is essential. 
   The following thesis will seek to discern the primary reason for the decline in political 
participation and the primary concern to the long-term stability of democracy via a unique 
combination of sources-which together-have not been utilized.  This includes the aforementioned 
surveys, which specifically ask South Africans who did not vote in 2004 to explain why they did 
not vote in order to understand the reason there was a decline in political participation.  
Secondly, the surveys also inquire as to what each South African believes to be the primary 
concern to the long-term stability of democracy in South Africa.  Furthermore, sources that have 
never been incorporated into the post-apartheid political culture historiography will be included 
to provide fresh insight and include the GII, CPI, and GCB.  These newly utilized sources will be 
combined with UNDP, WHO, and World Bank reports which will produce a unique integration 
of information and a historical understanding for the decline of political participation in South 
Africa.    
 However, in order to fully understand the post-apartheid political culture one must fully 
understand the complex history of South Africa, improvements-or lack thereof-made in the 
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economic, educational, and healthcare sectors, and the South African publics’ perception of 
politics and government between 1994 and 2004.  Chapter Two will present a chronological 
overview of South African history since the arrival of Europeans at the Cape, in 1652, with an 
emphasis on race relations and how race influenced politics and the political culture.  
Specifically, Chapter Two will stress the importance of a political culture with mass political 
participation and the role it played in ending apartheid.  Chapter Three will present the 
improvements, or lack thereof, made in the economic, educational, and healthcare sectors 
between 1994 and 2004.  Because the ANC garnered widespread public support by promising 
the end of racial inequality, it was essential that racial inequality was reduced to some extent in 
order to retain an active political culture.  With the important sectors of post-apartheid South 
Africa presented in Chapter Three, Chapter Four will provide an overview of political 
participation between 1994 and 2004.  Furthermore, Chapter Four will explain the various causes 
for the decline of political participation in South Africa while attempting to garner the main 
reason an active and optimistic political culture transformed into one with high levels of 
disillusionment and low levels of political participation only ten years later.  Finally, Chapter 
Five will reiterate the points made in Chapter Three and Four along with the conclusions that 
were attained. 
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CHAPTER TWO: SOUTH AFRICA TO 1994 
 
When the Zulu empire finally succumbed to British forces at the Battle of Ulundi on 4 
July 1879, the last African force standing in the way of British expansion in southern Africa had 
been defeated.  Nearly five years later European powers would meet in Berlin, Germany to 
discuss the partitioning of Africa.  At the Berlin Africa Conference, it was decided that African 
lands were open to any European nation given that it had not been claimed by another European 
nation.  By taking this approach, it was hoped that European conflict over trade and territory in 
Africa would be eliminated, while also depriving “indigenous leaders of the possibility of 
alternative European allies, and confronted with a single European nation, their potential 
bargaining strength.”33  The consensus reached at this conference established the guidelines for 
rapid European expansion and what is now commonly referred to as Bismarck’s ‘Scramble for 
Africa’.34
 The ensuing decades saw the manifestation of this imperialistic ideology as black 
Africans were stripped of their land by newly arrived Europeans and displaced to poor-barren 
tracts of land. The disparity inherent in this construct continued in South Africa throughout the 
twentieth century under the policy of apartheid.  However, the groundwork for apartheid had 
been laid during nearly three centuries of colonialism.  Thus, in order to fully understand the far-
reaching racial divisions that continue to plague South Africa, and the challenges present in 
1994, it is necessary to trace back to the first settlement established by the Dutch in 1652. 
  
                                                 
33 Ronald Robinson, ed., Bismarck, Europe, and Africa: The Berlin Africa Conference 1884-1885 and the 
Onset of Partition (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 21. 
 
34 Otto Von Bismarck was the President of Prussia and organized the Berlin Africa Conference; where 
European nations met and decided on how to settle disputes on trading and territorial entitlements.   
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Dutch Colonial Era (1652-1795) 
 
 As trade between Europe and the Far East increased during the seventeenth century, the 
traffic passing south of the Cape of Good Hope increased as well.  Resultantly, in 1652 the 
Dutch Verenigde Oostindische Company (VOC) established a refreshing station near the cape at 
Table Bay.  The station sought to provide a secure waypoint for sailors while also limiting their 
consumption of valuable goods and resources.  Upon establishment, the VOC ordered that all of 
its employees should avoid conflict with the Khoisan, the colonial term given to the Khoi and 
San, the native peoples who inhabited the areas surrounding the Cape.  However, as VOC 
employees completed their contracts and were granted permission to settle around the station as 
farmers, also known as freeburghers, disputes between the VOC and the Khoisan over land 
ownership arose.  Consequently, in 1660 the Khoisan were informed that they would need to 
leave the areas surrounding the station; the Khoisan complied with this demand.  It is important 
to note that this series of events can be seen as a microcosm of South African race relations, as 
less than twenty years after the establishment of Table Bay the native Khoisan had already been 
dispossessed of a valuable tract of land by the newly arrived Europeans.  
 Seeking to capitalize on the resources offered by the Cape, the VOC encouraged the 
expansion of the agricultural industry.  This encouragement led to the rise in the number of 
freeburghers; for example, in 1731, 435 farms received permits, in stark contrast to the 50 that 
were granted in 1682.35
                                                 
35 Sampie Terreblanche, History of Inequality in South Africa, 1652-2002, (Pietermaritzburg, ZA: 
University of Natal Press, 2002), 155. 
  In order to fulfill the growing demand for labor the VOC began 
importing slaves and free white laborers, known as knechts.  By 1808, nearly 63,000 slaves had 
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been imported to the Cape, with predominantly Indian slaves prior to 1750 and African slaves 
thereafter.  While slaves were under permanent servitude, knechts usually worked for five years 
before receiving a farm of their own; producing a steady demand for land and cheap labor.  This 
continual demand for more land was further exacerbated by the abandonment of tilling farming 
in favor of pastoral farming, which requires more land for each farm.  Moreover, because early 
farmers were given no restriction on farm sizes, arable land surrounding the Cape soon became a 
valuable commodity.36
The search for fresh grazing lands led the descendants of freeburghers, known as boers, 
further and further away from Cape Town as they unceasingly pushed into what they considered 
the frontier.  Because the boers constantly progressed eastward into un-chartered lands they 
adopted a system of trekking during the day and allowing their cattle to graze at night.  This 
earned them the name trekboers, as they were farmers who constantly trekked into the frontier.  
However, to look solely through the eyes of trekboers as they pushed into un-chartered territories 
fails to recognize the multitude of African peoples who had occupied these lands for centuries.  
This included not only the Khoi and San, whom were previously mentioned, but also the 
Bushman, Tswana, Xhosa, and Bantu.  To these African peoples the land was not un-chartered 
nor was there any semblance of a frontier.  Furthermore, they saw the trekboers not as farmers 
but as invaders “whose slow but relentless advance threatened the settled ways of all who stood 
in their path.”
 
37
                                                 
36 P. J. van der Merwe, the Migrant Farmer in the History of the Cape Colony 1657-1842, (Athens, OH: 
Ohio University Press, 1995), 62. 
  Despite intermittent periods of resistance and conflict, by 1786 trekboers 
seeking unclaimed land had crossed the Fish River, which is over 800 kilometers east of the 
 
37 Norman Etherington, the Great Trek: The Transformation of Southern Africa, 1815-1854 (London: 
Longman Publishers, 2001), 48. 
 20 
Cape.38  The steady influx of settlers and slaves, along with the move towards pastoral farming, 
produced an ever-expanding and diversified colony comprised of indigenous peoples; migrants 
from throughout Europe, including notable numbers of German, French, Dutch, and British 
settlers; and slaves from India, Indonesia, and East Africa.  More importantly, it was during this 
period that the groundwork for a racial hierarchy was established as whites developed “a sense of 
their physical and cultural difference from racial ‘others’; and difference generally meant 
superiority.”39
 
 
British Colonial Era (1795-1910) 
 
During the trekboer expansion east, French forces briefly seized Cape Town as Napoleon 
sought to strategically interrupt British trade and challenge their naval supremacy.  In order to 
prevent the French from returning, Britain decided to send a military detachment to occupy the 
Cape Colony in 1795.  This occupation lasted until 1803 when the Treaty of Amiens was signed, 
which briefly gave sole control of Cape Colony back to the Dutch.  However, three years later 
the British returned after France threatened to make a concerted push into the region of southern 
Africa.  Between 1795 and 1814, Britain was unsure of their long-term involvement in South 
Africa and as a result did not alter or implement any change of consequence.  For instance, 
although the slave trade was officially banned throughout the British Empire in 1807, the slave 
populace continued to rise in Cape Town.   
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This period of lax control ended when Britain formally and permanently assumed control 
of Cape Colony with the signing of the Anglo-Dutch Treaty of 1814.  British authorities began 
by implementing British policies and trade restrictions before turning their attention to the issue 
of race and labor constructs.  The shift in racial ideology was fueled by the Enlightenment and 
humanistic ideals espoused by such scholars as John Locke, along with efforts by newly-arrived 
missionaries such as Minister William Shaw.  Shaw was especially outspoken about the 
treatment of Africans pointing out “how strange that the pride of colour should even infect good 
men, and they themselves at the same time appear not to be sensible that they act under the 
influence of this baneful prejudice.”40
For example, in 1823 the British colonial office began allowing slaves to appear in court 
and marry, while placing a limit on the duration of forced labor and the use of corporal 
punishment by slave owners.  A proclamation made three years later went even further and 
allowed all slaves to buy their freedom.  In 1828, the colonial office began permitting Xhosa’s 
seeking employment entrance in Cape Town while allowing free-colored individuals the rights to 
own land and travel without a pass.
  As a result of this racial activism, laws that specifically 
focused on improving the treatment of slaves in the colony were enacted. 
41  These proclamations, along with the decision to begin the 
emancipation of all slaves in the British Empire in 1834, caused a rift to develop between the 
crown and Cape settlers as the British drastically altered how power, labor patterns, and race 
relations were structured in the Cape.42
                                                 
40 William Shaw, The journal of William Shaw, (Cape Town, ZA: A. A. Balkema, 1972), 180. 
  The trekboers understood the implications of these 
changes all too well and in 1837 a large group made the decision to leave the realm of the Cape 
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and the control of British authorities.  This decision resulted with a massive exodus of settlers 
who migrated northeast, which is now known as the Great Trek.  
 Between 1837 and 1843, upwards of 15,000 Afrikaner farmers left the Cape in search of 
the autonomy that their ancestors had enjoyed under Dutch colonialism.  The initial party, led by 
Piet Retief, made its way eastward until they reached Port Natal several months later.  There they 
came into contact with the most powerful empire in South Africa, the Zulu.  The Zulu empire 
developed during the decades before the Great Trek.  The 1820s and 1830s had been dominated 
by a period of unrest and turmoil known as the mfecane, as the emerging Zulu empire sought to 
consolidate neighboring peoples into their ranks.  After initially coming to an uneasy truce with 
the Zulu, specifically King Shaka, Piet Retief and a small party of Afrikaners were ambushed 
and killed during peace talks.  In response to this perceived treachery, the Afrikaners moved 
north, crossing the Blood River and defeating the Zulu army in convincing fashion at the Battle 
of Blood River.43
 While the Boers resorted to warfare against the Zulu, for the most part “throughout their 
travels, the emigrants showed a preference for negotiation and treaty-making with African 
chiefs.”
  The victory at Blood River exemplified the advantage of European firearms 
and provided stability in Natal, enabling the foundation of the Natalia Republic in 1838. 
44
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  Ironically, the relative ease of the trek was made possible by the Zulu, as much of the 
interior of South Africa was not heavily populated due to Zulu military prowess.  Zulu battles 
against other African groups during the mfecane were usually very one-sided due to 
advancements made by Shaka.  This included the development of specialized regiments called 
impis, the introduction of boys who carried soldiers’ equipment called uDibi, and the 
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implementation of a short-broad bladed assegai, which replaced the light-throwing and flimsy 
assegai used by neighboring armies.  Lastly, Shaka developed a military formation called the 
horns of the buffalo, which was crescent-shaped and “consisted of several densely packed 
regiments in the center, or head, and one regiment on each side forming the horns.”45  The 
implementation of these advances almost always resulted in either the opposition’s complete 
annihilation or assimilation into the Zulu ranks.  Indeed, Shaka “fought for total annihilation.”46
The remnants of the enemy’s army sought shelter in an adjoining wood, out  
 
Henry Francis Fynn, an early settler of Natal, described an 1826 Zulu battle where: 
of which they were soon driven.  Then began a slaughter of the women and  
children.  They were all put to death.  The cattle being taken by the different  
regiments were driven to the kraal lately occupied by Sikhunyana.  The battle,  
from the commencement to the close, did not last more than an hour and a half.   
The numbers of the hostile tribe, including women and children, could not have 
been less than 40,000.  The number of cattle taken was estimated at 60,000.47
 
 
 Because of such battles, when the British annexed the Natalia Republic in 1843 and the 
Boers left Natal to be free of British control, they faced little opposition during the subsequent 
establishment of the Orange Free State and South Africa Republic. This is not to suggest that the 
Boers did not face any opposition during the early years of these republics; the Ndebele and Zulu 
put up valiant campaigns during periods of warfare against the Boers.48
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  Nevertheless, by 1850 
African resistance had been broken and the permanent presence of Europeans was assured in the 
Highveld.  This was a major turning point in South African history as the establishment of the 
Boer republics, along with the permanent presence of Europeans in the heart of Africa, greatly 
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expedited European economic and infrastructural expansion into the interior of southern 
Africa.49
As the nineteenth century progressed, mercantilism as an economic system began to fall 
out of favor.  In turn, colonial officials began requiring its colonies to become self-sufficient; the 
Cape Colony included.  This increased demand for monetary profit led to an expansion in the 
agricultural production of the Cape including the wine and wool industry, which demanded both 
more land and more labor.  In order to satisfy these requirements, British authorities began a 
systematic reversal of race relations as officials sought to dispossess Africans, specifically the 
Xhosa from the Eastern Cape, of their lands.  An example of this change in policy is the 
Vagrancy Act of 1834, which stipulated that all Africans living or hunting on ‘unused’ lands 
were considered criminals and were to be arrested.  The motivation behind this piece of 
legislature was clear; to discourage Africans from living independently in ‘rogue’ communities 
and force them to become landless laborers for white farmers.  In 1841, the Masters and Servants 
Act was passed which was aimed at coloured workers and mandated severe criminal sanctions to 
any worker who was in breach of contract or was disobedient to their employer.  Specifically, the 
law “sought to buttress the racial hierarchy and to reinforce the subordination of coloured 
workers.”
  
50  Indeed, by the 1840’s the humanistic ideals of the Enlightenment and Great 
Awakening had given way to the need for land and a large dependent labor class, which required 
Africans to be inferior in order to justify their exploitation.51
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In response to this swift reversal of policy, many Africans resisted efforts to include them 
in the system of racial capitalism as landless laborers.  They recognized the hypocrisy behind 
racial capitalistic ideology, and on a larger scale, the colonial regime.  After all, only a decade 
earlier the same office had abolished slavery, which had included emancipating many of the 
fathers of the young Africans who were being conscripted as landless laborers.52
Although initially Mlanjeni and his followers earned early victories against both 
European settlers and the British, by the beginning of 1852 the tide had drastically turned.  As 
had happened in the ‘Great Trek’ and the previous frontier wars, including those of 1834 and 
1846, the British once again overpowered the African resistance with the assistance of superior 
military firepower.  More important than the outcome was the fact that for the first time since 
1799, the Khoisan had fought with the Xhosa against the whites.
  Resistance to 
racial capitalism and the encroachment of European settlers into the Eastern Cape included 
thievery and sabotage.  These crimes were used by whites to reinforce the image of the African 
as uncivilized, treacherous and mischievous.  The escalating conflict between Africans and 
Europeans reached a boiling point with the Khoisan Rebellion of 1851.  The rebellion, led by a 
prophet named Mlanjeni, erupted as a result of the enactment of the Squatter’s Ordinance of 
1850.  This act outlawed independent African settlements such as the Kat River settlement.  
53
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  This signified a turning point 
regarding race as it was clear South African society had fully reverted back to white versus 
black; the ‘civilized’ versus the ‘other’.  Furthermore, following the war the British dispossessed 
land from those who participated in the uprising and created a Royal Reserve within which 
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Africans could not live in villages larger than twenty huts, had to pay an annual rent of ten 
shillings, and could not own more than twenty cattle per hut.54
Between the 1850s and 1880s the Orange Free State and South African Republic 
struggled financially.  Suitable grazing was somewhat limited due to unprecedented periods of 
drought and African peoples were unwilling to serve as a docile labor force.  The failed 
proletarianisation of Africans forced Afrikaners to attain cheap labor via slave raiding despite 
agreeing not to as stipulated in the Sand River Convention of 1852.
 
55  In response to slave 
raiding, the dispossession of land, and forced monetary tribute, many Africans perceived the 
presence of the republics themselves as an act of warfare and continually resisted the Afrikaners.  
This not only includes the previously mentioned Basotho kingdom, but the Sekhukhune and the 
Pedi, whom the Afrikaners required the assistance of black soldiers to attain victory against.56  
Resistance did not stop with armed conflict but also included sabotage, thievery and the 
destruction of property, which further hurt the Boer republics financially.  However, African 
opposition did not stop the accruement of lands by whites as, for example, by 1878 Europeans 
possessed roughly 420,000 of the less than 520,000 acres of land in Griqualand.57
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In 1886, the financial state of the South African Republic vastly improved following the 
discovery of gold in the Witwatersrand, which had a far larger gold deposit than those previously 
found in the Transvaal during the 1870s.  The plethora of gold found in the Witwatersrand 
transformed the Transvaal “from a state of chronic semi-bankruptcy” into “the richest country of 
the entire continent, let alone South Africa.”58  Seeing an opportunity to capitalize on this market 
many British settlers traveled from the Cape to the Transvaal.  By 1895, these foreign settlers 
called uitlanders had settled in the Transvaal to such an extent that they threatened the stability of 
Afrikaner control in the Transvaal.  Paul Kruger, long time president of the South African 
Republic, foresaw this development and provided governmental representation to uitlanders in 
1890.59
Already on board with the attempted takeover of the South African Republic in 1895, it 
did not take long for Britain to decide on a timetable for dealing with the Boer republics.  In 
order to protect the rich mineral deposits from other European nations, specifically Germany, 
and seeking to instill racial capitalism to more efficiently mine gold and diamonds, the British 
began a concerted effort to yet again annex the Transvaal.
  However, representation itself was not enough for uitlanders.  Led by Sir Henry Loch 
and motivated by promises of British assistance from Cecil Rhodes, they attempted to seize 
Johannesburg in 1895.  The Jameson Raid of 1895, as the attempted takeover is called, ended in 
failure as Loch did not wait for British assistance and attempted the feat on his own. 
60
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  By 1899 this effort resulted in the 
Anglo-Boer war, which devastated all levels of society and impoverished both Afrikaners and 
Africans alike.  With victory over the republics and the Afrikaner threat affectively dissolved, the 
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British sought to make amends and unite with the Boers along racial lines.  Indeed, after signing 
the Peace of Vereeniging in 1902, Afrikaners were allowed to keep their firearms, property, and 
language in school and court.61
More importantly, the British did not provide Africans with the right to vote, as had been 
done in the Cape, with the decree that the issue would be resolved only after the republics once 
again had self-government.  By following this agenda the British ensured control of the mines, 
an alliance with Afrikaners, and the creation of a large-black proletariat class much like had been 
created during the 1840s in the Cape.  However, some white South Africans believed that this 
social hierarchy and economic exploitation would lead to long-term problems in the Transvaal.  
For instance, in 1907 Afrikaner J. West Ridgeway stated: 
    
As long as these native races were uncivilised, and even savage, it was right 
to withhold privileges from them.  But now these races are rapidly progressing 
in education, in wealth, in Enlightenment, and last, but not least, in appreciation 
of their own rights and power.  This problem must be dealt with, and promptly 
dealt with; otherwise there will be a terrible day of reckoning, and a most  
disastrous Nemesis may yet descend upon the white races of South Africa.62
 
 
In 1906, the British accorded the Boer republics self-government to assure the 
continuation of social stability.  Three years later, the British Parliament passed the Act of 
Westminster of 1909, which decreed that white settlers, both Afrikaners and British, would 
assume control of South Africa.  This stipulation ensured “white political domination, and 
affectively disenfranchised blacks in South Africa.”63
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  As dictated in the Peace of Vereeniging, 
white South Africans had the opportunity to extend voting rights to coloureds and Africans living 
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in the Transvaal and Orange Free State.  However, white South Africans did not, and for nearly 
seventy years would not, give Africans the right to vote.  Understandably, white South Africans 
did not intend on sharing power or undermining a racial capitalistic system that greatly benefited 
them. 
 
Pre-apartheid Era (1910-1948) 
 
 Despite losing the Anglo-Boer war, the successful migration and subsequent survival in 
the heart of Africa amongst a wealth of African peoples would be used by Afrikaners during the 
twentieth century to not only promote Afrikaner nationalism, but to exemplify their triumph over 
the uncivilized savages.64  This ideological superiority and entitlement manifested itself 
immediately following the Union of South Africa as Afrikaners pressured newly elected Prime 
Minister Louis Botha to address white unemployment.  As a result of this pressure, Botha 
enacted two laws that marginalized and pigeonholed black South Africans while also 
establishing the precedence for racially unequal legislature.  Signed in 1911, the Mines and 
Works Act stipulated that black South Africans could not work or be employed in skilled 
positions; while the Native Labour Regulation Act prohibited black contract workers from 
striking or organizing and made any breach of contract illegal.  Together these laws ensured that 
“people of colour could not acquire mining licenses or trade in minerals; and they could only 
work on the gold mines in the service of whites.”65
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these laws had on African society, through the instillation of a racial division of labor in the most 
profitable South African industry, cannot be underemphasized.  Indeed, within a year of the 
passing of these laws the first national political organization dedicated to protecting African 
rights was founded.  
 On 8 January 1912 the South African Native National Congress, which would later 
become the ANC, was established to oppose the aforementioned laws and white domination that 
accompanied them.  Because the early leaders of the ANC were Christian educated, they 
believed that resistance should focus on non-violent reasoning and the persuasion of officials to 
alter discriminating laws.  However, this practice proved ineffective at both improving the 
African position and rallying widespread African support.  Another hindrance to African support 
was the degree to which many Africans were impoverished and were forced to focus on 
subsistence instead of political organization.66
 In 1913 the Native Land Act was enacted.  This piece of legislature carried over the racial 
divisions of labor stipulated in the Mines and Works Act and the Native Labour Regulation Act, 
and extended it to racially dividing land.  While the dispossession of African land was certainly 
not a new thing in South Africa, as mentioned earlier it dates back to the 1660s when 
freeburghers in the Cape encroached on and took Khoisan lands, the act legally and 
systematically authorized land dispossession.  Specifically, it sought to “get rid of those features 
of African land ownership and share-cropping which white farmers found undesirable, and 
  As a result, for the first thirty years of its 
existence the ANC remained weak, as its membership was overwhelmingly restricted to the 
small-formally educated black bourgeois. 
                                                 
66 Dale T. McKinley, The ANC and the Liberation Struggle, (London: Pluto Press, 1997), 9. 
 
 31 
enlarge reserves to ease congestion and facilitate the recruiting of labour for the mines.”67  
Furthermore, the Native Land Act built upon the Glen Grey Act and encouraged the employment 
of migrant laborers subsisting in the rural native reserves.68
 While the Mines and Works Act and Native Labour Regulation Act protected skilled 
positions for Afrikaners, they failed to protect semi-skilled positions and were primarily aimed at 
improving the monetary profit of British owned mines.  Despite the enactment of these laws, the 
large Afrikaner proletariat that had emerged as a result of the Anglo-Boer war continued to 
struggle and became increasingly frustrated.  This frustration culminated with the 1922 Rand 
Revolt as Afrikaners, angered by the fact that they were being replaced by blacks in semi-skilled 
mining positions, sought to protect their labor position in the racial hierarchy.
 
69
In order to accomplish these tasks a coalition government led by James Barry Munnik 
Hertzog, and which appealed to both British and Afrikaner interests, was elected.  The ‘Pact 
Government’, as it was to be called, created several laws that sought to ensure that white workers 
would remain dominant over African workers.  The first law, the Industrial Conciliation Act, was 
enacted just before the Pact Government was inaugurated in 1924.  This act gave official 
recognition to both mixed and white trade unions, while excluding Africans from joining these 
unions and prohibiting the creation of black unions.  Thus, white and coloured workers were 
guaranteed a binding minimum wage for all types of work while Africans received no minimum 
  Although this 
strike was resolved it exemplified the need for the Union government to appeal to the Afrikaner 
populace and protect their position from black competition.   
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wage for any type of work.70
Resultantly, “by the 1930s, it was becoming increasingly clear that segregation was being 
implemented, under Afrikaner nationalist patronage, to counter English liberal hegemony and to 
ensure continued white dominance over blacks.”
  The second law was an amendment to the Mines and Works Act of 
1911 and reinforced racial segregation in the mining industry.   
71  However, while Hertzog and the Pact 
Government had succeeded in appealing to Afrikaners, the laws themselves failed to improve 
white unemployment and poverty.  This failure was magnified by falling wages resulting from 
the collapse of the New York stock exchange in 1929.  A 1932 report released by the Carnegie 
Commission “found that one-third of Afrikaners were ‘desperately poor’, while another third 
were classified as ‘poor’.”72  Against the backdrop of financial angst and angered by African 
urbanization, Afrikaner scholars and intellectuals began propagating anti-British imperialism, 
Afrikaner superiority, and African inferiority.73
One of the byproducts of the Afrikaner nationalistic movement was the formation of the 
‘purified’ National Party (NP) in 1933. Led by D. F. Malan, the NP spoke out against the influx 
of Africans into urban areas and sought to instill Afrikaner dominance throughout South African 
society, particularly in both the economic and political sectors.  Many Afrikaners feared that 
“white self-determination was neither politically secure nor morally defensible in the midst of 
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the renewed ‘economic integration’ of Africans in the ‘white’ areas of the country.”74  As a 
response to the threat posed by this nationalistic movement, Hertzog and Smutz merged parties 
and created the Unified Party (UP) in 1934.  The decision to unify parties along with the passing 
of several anti-African laws in 1936 and 1937, allowed the UP to stay in power until 1948.  
These anti-African laws included the Native Trust and Land Act (1936) which expanded the 
African rural reserves, and the Native Laws Amendment Act (1937) which sought to control the 
African presence in urban areas.  However these laws did not successfully segregate South 
African society and failed to keep Africans from ‘encroaching’ into urban centers.  Indeed from 
1936 to 1946 the African urban populace increased by over 57%.75
Coinciding with African urbanization was the development of strong opposition from the 
African, Coloured, and Indian populaces.  Seeking to capitalize on this increased political 
activity the ANC, in one of its earliest significant accomplishments, convened the All Africa 
Convention (AAC) in 1935.  For the first time, the AAC combined the separate efforts of the 
marginalized populaces in an attempt to provide a unified front to fight white domination.  Over 
400 delegates from every province in South Africa attended this meeting in hopes of protecting 
the voting rights of those in the Cape while extending voting rights to those in the other three 
provinces.
   
76
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  Despite requests for militant action, the older leaders of the ANC continued to 
adhere to a policy of non-violent reasoning and the AAC ended without making any real 
progress.   
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Although the AAC did not directly accomplish anything of consequence, it set the 
precedence for a nationally unified black political culture and its failure eventually led to the 
creation of the ANC Youth League.  Many of the younger members of the ANC, including 
Walter Sisulu and Nelson Mandela, believed that the policy of persuasion was futile, as evident 
by the failure of the AAC, and that direct large scale protest was necessary for change.  A year 
after the establishment of the ANC Youth League the change in policy advocated by these young 
leaders became indirectly evident with the Mineworker’s Strike of 1946.  Led by individuals 
from the Community Party of South Africa (CPSA), the Mineworker’s Strike of 1946 saw over 
70,000 African miners refuse to work unless the African Mineworkers’ Union was recognized 
and workers were paid 10 shillings per day.77
Unfortunately for the UP, the Mineworker’s Strike and other instances of protest 
coincided with widespread Afrikaner poverty, fears of financial security, British economic 
domination, and repeated failures by the UP to prevent African urbanization.  Together these 
factors painted a landscape that Afrikaner’s deemed unacceptable in both the immediacy and the 
long term.  The response by the majority of Afrikaner’s was made apparent in the 1948 election 
when the NP was overwhelmingly elected and implemented a platform that promised to correct 
the aforementioned problems.  Called apartheid, the platform was aimed at separating races at 
  While neither of these demands was met, the ANC 
recognized both the abilities of the CPSA and the presence of a large populace willing to actively 
oppose the South African government.  This realization solidified the decision by the ANC to 
ally with the CPSA in order to accrue a larger support base and adopt a more direct, large-scale 
activist approach.  
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every level of South African society in order to preserve the different, especially Afrikaner, 
cultures in South Africa.   
 
Apartheid Era (1948-1994) 
 
 By far the most well-known and discussed topic in South African history is apartheid.  It 
is also quite possibly the most misunderstood topic.  Most individuals discuss apartheid as if it; 
1) was a continuous event that followed a single ‘Grand Plan’ until its dismantlement in 1994, 
and 2) was initially created primarily for the purpose of disenfranchising and oppressing the non-
white populace.  Both of these conclusions are inaccurate and their fallacies must be addressed 
before the chronological presentation of South African history can continue.  
To begin with, contrary to traditional interpretations apartheid was not a continuous event 
and changed drastically between its early years under Malan and its final years under De Klerk.  
Under the guidance of Malan (1948-1954), the NP followed a policy of economic integration 
which required the presence and employment of a significant urbanized black populace.  
However, under Malan’s predecessor Verwoerd (1958-1966), the NP ended economic 
integration and “no longer accorded employers the right to stipulate the number of African 
workers they required” while incorporating “drastic methods to reduce the urbanized African 
population.”78
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  These important changes made to apartheid during its first decade pale in 
comparison to the even more significant alterations made to apartheid during the Botha (1978-
1989) and De Klerk (1989-1994) administrations.  This includes the NP making important 
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concessions to anti-apartheid groups and negotiating the release of anti-apartheid prisoners in 
order to begin the process of ending apartheid in the early 1980s.   
Secondly, apartheid was not initially created for the purpose of disenfranchising and 
oppressing the non-white populace.  For instance, as early as 1948 Malan repeatedly argued 
against the UP and its platform of horizontal domination “in which whites ruled over blacks” and 
instead proposed the system of apartheid “because it involved separating ethnic groups so each 
could develop separately in its own cultural space.”79 Indeed, Malan was more concerned with 
replacing the Anglo controlled government with an Afrikaner government, than he was with the 
oppression of other races.80
With these inaccuracies clarified, the chronological presentation of South African history 
can continue.  As was mentioned earlier, the main thesis of apartheid centered on the separation 
of different ethnicities and races at every level of society in order to preserve each of the 
different cultures.  This goal was affectively addressed when the NP enacted the Prohibition of 
Mixed Marriages Act (1949) which outlawed interracial marriages; the Population Registration 
Act (1950) which classified South Africans by race; and the Group Areas Act (1950) which 
  Only when the NP had legitimized its position in government did it 
change its policy regarding economic integration and the acceptance of an urbanized black 
population.  However, the shift in policy did not occur until 1958 when then Prime Minister 
Verwoerd created independent African states in order to disenfranchise and affectively negate 
the African vote. Thus, apartheid was not initially aimed at disenfranchising the non-white 
population nor did it follow the continual ‘Grand Plan’ of oppression as it is so commonly 
described as following. 
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outlawed interracial communities and created single-race communities.  Together these laws 
succeeded, for the most part, in separating South African society by race.  Again, as mentioned 
earlier, under Malan the NP permitted Africans to live in white urban areas as long as their 
employment was deemed by their employer as necessary to industry.  The economic success of 
these industries legitimized NP power and encouraged international investments and multi-
million dollar loans from the World Bank.81
Immediately following the ascendance of the NP, the ANC drafted the Programme of 
Action in 1949.  The Programme of Action sought to unify the oppressed races in South Africa 
by formulating a common strategy to fight the apartheid state and called for international 
support, protests, strikes and boycotts.  Resulting from this declaration were three large 
interracial demonstrations held in 1950: the Freedom of Speech Convention, May Day, and the 
National Day of Protest.
 
82  While these demonstrations were milestones for mass-interracial 
protests they were quickly put down by the NP.  Regarding international support, pleas made by 
the ANC to the international community calling for an embargo on South African goods failed to 
materialize any assistance.83  These pleas were extended to the United Nations General 
Assembly who failed to issue any trade sanctions on South Africa until 1977.84
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America, the ANC allied with the South African Indian Congress (SAIC), the South African 
 
82 Leo Kuper, Passive Resistance in South Africa, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1957), 98, 99. 
 
83 The ANC requested the United States of America to aid in the anti-apartheid struggle and place an 
embargo on South Africa in order to pressure the NP.  However, as late as 1982 the American government was 
criticized by the United Nations General Assembly for providing support and encouragement to the South African 
government.  United Nations United Nations General Assembly, 1982. 
 
84 McKinley, The ANC and the Liberation Struggle, 94. 
 
 38 
Coloured People’s Organisation (SACPO) and the Congress of Democrats (COD) in 1955.  Now 
known as the Congress of the People, this alliance produced the Freedom Charter, which 
borrowed the ideals of racial equality from the Programme of Action and went one step further 
demanding both financial and land redistribution.85
The Freedom Charter drastically changed the political culture of South Africa by 
encouraging more direct forms of protest and participation on a larger scale.  Up to 1955 there 
had been instances of mass-protest but not nearly to the extent or regularity as during the ensuing 
decades.  This includes the infamous 1960 Sharpeville shootings where 69 people, comprised of 
mostly women and children, were shot and killed by the police.  The Sharpeville massacre 
triggered riots throughout South Africa and forced the NP to respond by banning the ANC, 
which led the initial protest in Sharpeville, and arrest over 2,000 of its members including 
Nelson Mandela.
   
86  Furthermore, Sharpeville permanently escalated conflict in South Africa as 
following 1960 “extra-legal activity commenced on a wide scale, both by black opposition 
movements and by the state’s own security forces.”87
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  The heightened crackdown on resistance 
to the apartheid state was solidified when South Africa declared itself an independent republic in 
1961.  The aggressive response by the NP resulted in the 1961 formation of an anti-apartheid 
militant group called Umkhonto we Sizwe, translated as the ‘Spear of the Nation’ or (MK).  The 
MK was organized and led by Nelson Mandela, along with Joe Slovo from the SACP, and 
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targeted government buildings and military instillations in hopes of bringing the NP to its 
senses.88
With assistance from the SACP, the MK sought to procure international support from the 
Soviet Union as well as Algeria, Ghana, Tanzania, Zambia, and East Germany.  However, the 
arrest of Nelson Mandela in 1962 was a significant blow to the accomplishment of this endeavor 
and the overall strength of the ANC and the MK.  The international assistance received was 
minimal and, while the MK successfully carried out many sabotage missions, the impact on the 
apartheid state was negligible. More importantly, the focus of black resistance on garnering 
international support and resisting via a small-armed front virtually extinguished the mass 
participation that had been fostered in South Africa during the 1950s.
   
89
The intensification by both the NP and anti-apartheid groups continued from the early 
1960s and ended well into the late 1980s.  During this period whenever the NP “faced mounting 
internal resistance, so did it depend more and more on extra-judicial procedures, the brute power 
of the police force, and other repressive apparatus.”
  For the remainder of the 
1960s the ANC, the MK, and the overall non-white resistance struggled to survive amidst strong 
NP crackdowns.  This shift towards more aggressive policing was further intensified as a result 
of the General Laws Amendment Acts, which were passed between 1962 and 1964.  
Specifically, these laws increased the power and size of the police and defense force while giving 
the police the authority to imprison suspected agitators up to 90 days without bail.   
90
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Verwoerd’s predecessor Prime Minister Balthazar Johannes Vorster immediately took steps to 
improve the economic state of South Africa by ending job reservations for whites.  Vorster also 
came to the conclusion that Verwoerd’s policies on African urbanization and resistance were not 
succeeding.  As a result, by the early 1970s the NP began intensifying influx controls and sped 
up the construction of industry near black homelands.91
 Interestingly, the change in NP policy shortly followed a change in ANC policy.  In 
1969, the ANC had adopted a policy entitled ‘Strategy and Tactics’, which called for a renewal 
of mass mobilization in South Africa and heightened international pressure on the apartheid 
regime.  The encouragement of mass mobilization was furthered by the ‘Black Consciousness 
Movement’ which called for world-wide black solidarity. Thus, the intensification of influx 
controls and the continued relocation of Africans to rural townships came at a time when there 
had recently been a renewal of anti-apartheid rhetoric aimed at increasing black resistance to 
apartheid.  The result of these colliding forces was evident in 1976 with the Soweto uprising. 
  
The Soweto uprising intially began as a peaceful student demonstation aimed at 
protesting the decision by the government that African students would be required to learn the 
Afrikaner language in school.  Organized by the Soweto Student’s Representative Council, 
approximately twenty thousand students marched towards Orlando Stadium on 16 June 1976.92
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After repeated orders by police to disperse, the police fired into the crowd killing dozens of 
students and injuring many more.  In response to the shooting, Africans throughout South Africa 
rioted drawing widespread international attention while forever escalating both the internal and 
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external struggle against apartheid.93  Internally, thousands of Africans subsequently left South 
Africa to join the ANC or the MK.  Externally, the United Nations responded by convening the 
Special Committee against Apartheid, which met on 3 August 1976.  In a report released 
following the hearing the committee stated that Soweto has “shown that there can be no solution 
to the grave situation in South Africa without the replacement of the minority racist regime.”94
The Soweto Uprising made it clear that the strength and resolve of the urban black 
populace was, and would continue to, damage South Africa’s infrastructure and its economy; 
Prime Minister Botha was no exception.  Following Soweto, Botha abandoned the use of 
Afrikaner nationalistic rhetoric that his predecessors had expounded while also coming to the 
realization that apartheid could not survive in the long-term.  In 1982, Botha began a concerted 
effort to implement consociationalism, a power-sharing representative form of government 
which mandates governmental representation of all races.  For the next seven years, Botha 
lobbied consociationalism to both the international community and the non-white population in 
South Africa.  Unwilling to allow any form of apartheid to persist, the anti-apartheid resistance 
denounced consociationalism arguing that it was simply a continuation of apartheid under a 
different guise and escalated their opposition as evidenced by the 1984 Township Revolt..  
Furthermore, the United Nations stated in 1984 that it was convinced that consociationalism 
would “further entrench apartheid” and is aimed at “dividing the unity of the oppressed people of 
  
From this point on the United Nations called for the end of apartheid and the support of anti-
apartheid groups. 
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South Africa.”95  Thus, despite his sincere efforts “Botha’s attempts at ending Verwoerdian 
apartheid created not consociational democracy, but rather produced the most violent and brutal 
period of apartheid.”96
On 20 June 1986, the United Nations convened the World Conference on Sanctions 
against Racist South Africa in Paris, France.  At the conference the United Nations called for the 
immediate end to apartheid while commenting that the “growing scope and intensity of the 
struggle in South Africa have shown that for the struggling people of South Africa there is no 
turning back and that they will continue the fight, enduring suffering and facing death until 
victory is won and the evil of apartheid is vanquished.”
   
97
This chapter has sought to provide a brief presentation of the long and complex racial 
history of South Africa.  Thus, there has been a tendency to focus on the process by which South 
Africa developed a complex racial makeup along with how the construct, interpretation, and 
meaning of race have repeatedly changed since 1652.  In the midst of providing this overview, 
there have undoubtedly been several important events that were either not discussed or not 
  Together, pressure from international 
bodies along with continued anti-apartheid resistance convinced Botha that attempts to garner 
support for consociationalism would be fruitless.  Beginning in 1987, both Botha and his 
predecessor de Klerk worked with anti-apartheid leaders, including then imprisoned Nelson 
Mandela, to negotiate an end to apartheid.  As is well known, these negotiations successfully led 
to the end of apartheid in 1994 and the promise of equality for all South African citizens 
regardless of race or ethnicity. 
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explained to the fullest extent; this is unavoidable due to the constraints and focus of this thesis.  
The points that are important to understand are: 1) the role a political culture with mass 
participation played in ending apartheid while also establishing the first true democratic 
government and 2) the numerous challenges that were presented to the post-apartheid 
government, the ANC, and Nelson Mandela when he was inaugurated as president.  Specifically, 
the difficult challenge of uniting an unequal society that had been segregated for so long and to 
such an extent cannot be underestimated.  Indeed, it was this very challenge that required the 
redistribution of wealth, land, and the end of racial inequality-especially regarding poverty and 
unemployment-which Nelson Mandela promised to address in 1994.  
 44 
CHAPTER THREE: INFRASTRUCTURAL CHANGES FROM 1994-2004 
 
 Referring back to the well-known inaugural address given by Nelson Mandela, promises 
of equality and a better life for all South Africans played a crucial role in garnering widespread 
support for himself and the ANC.  And although a better life is an ambiguous and immeasurable 
concept, the curtailing of poverty and inequality is not.  With this in mind, it should not be 
surprising that most individuals would feel dismayed if these problems were not affectively 
addressed in a timely and sustainable manner.  Thus, while it is plausible that a better life could 
be elongated to those of future generations, the reduction of poverty and inequality cannot.  The 
ANC therefore put itself in the position that all South Africans would experience improvements 
in the immediacy, not in the future.  The following chapter will present the improvements, or 
lack thereof, made to some of the key areas necessary for the end of poverty and inequality in 
South Africa.  Specifically, these areas are the economic, education, and healthcare sectors. 
 
Economy 
 
        At the forefront of the many promises made by Nelson Mandela in 1994 was that the ANC 
would “create jobs” while ending “the widespread poverty so pervasive among the majority of” 
South Africans.98
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inequality.  From 1994 to 2004, none of these requirements were sufficiently met.  A 1998 report 
released by the Inter-Ministerial Committee for Poverty and Inequality stated that 61% of black 
South Africans lived in poverty while only 1% of white South Africans were impoverished.99  
One explanation for the lack of monetary redistribution was the adherence by the government to 
the conservative economic growth policy, Growth Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) 
program.  Specifically, GEAR called for a tight monetary policy centered on fiscal contraction 
and aimed at decreasing national debt.  Proponents argued that by concentrating on the gradual 
construction of a stabile economy there would be an influx of foreign investment and 
subsequently employment opportunities.100  And while the policies of GEAR underscored the 
reality that the ANC was steering away from social democracy in favor of procedural 
democracy, supporters of GEAR stressed that improvements stemming from GEAR would be 
experienced by 2001.101
             However despite implementing the strategies and polices that comprised GEAR, 
between 1994 and 2000 South Africa “performed substantially worse in terms of GDP growth, 
levels of investment and unemployment than other transitional economies such as Malaysia, 
Chile, South Korea, Egypt, and Brazil.”
 
102
                                                 
99 Inter-Ministerial Committee for Poverty and Inequality, Poverty and Inequality in South Africa, summary 
report, 1998, accessed 25 November 2008, 
  A 1998 report released by United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP) found that unemployment in South Africa had climbed to 
http://www.queensu.ca/sarc/Projects/AIDS/Poverty.htm. 
 
100 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), South Africa: the Challenge of Sustainable 
Development, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), national report, 40. 
 
101 UNDP, 2003, national report, 40. 
 
102 Stefan Andreasson, “The African National Congress and its Critics: ‘Predator Liberalism’ Black 
Empowerment and Intra-Alliance Tensions in Post-Apartheid South Africa,” Democratization 13, no. 2 (April 
2006): 308. 
 
 46 
30% and that growing numbers of poor South African families relied on pensioners or the unpaid 
labor of their grandchildren for subsistence.103  Buttressing these findings, the 1998 Poverty and 
Inequality Report released comparable data while also concluding that poverty continued to fall 
along regional and racial lines as 71% of the overwhelmingly black rural populace was 
impoverished.104 A follow-up report released in 2000 by the UNDP concluded that 
unemployment had increased in South Africa and over 18 million South Africans were living in 
poverty.105  Indeed, conservative official measures placed unemployment at 16% in 1995 and at 
around 30% in 2002.106
 The release of the aforementioned reports, not to mention the visual evidence of the 
unemployed that increasingly dominated the South African landscape, should have made it clear 
to the government that unemployment and racial inequality were not being affectively addressed.  
However, despite the indicators adequate measures to correct these problems were not taken.  A 
2003 report released by the UNDP stated that “unemployment continues to rise unabated” 
despite the fact that “between 1996 and 2002, the unemployment rate increased from 19.3 per 
cent to 30.5 per cent.”
  
107  Furthermore, the 2003 UNDP report found that unemployment stood at 
31.2 % and roughly 48.5% of the population (21.9 million people) lived under the poverty 
line.108
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the fulfillment of the promises made by Nelson Mandela in 1994, nor were proper steps taken to 
curb rising unemployment.  As a result, at the end of the first decade under ANC leadership 
unemployment had risen in South Africa by roughly 13% and nearly half of the population lived 
under the poverty line compared to only 23.7% in 1994.109
         While for the most part GEAR failed to create enough jobs to reduce both unemployment 
and racial inequality, there were accomplishments made in the economic arena between 1994 
and 2004.  This includes the creation of formal employment positions which have produced a 
legitimate and sizeable black bourgeoisie.  Another accomplishment was a reduction in debt 
resulting from tighter fiscal spending; South Africa’s overall budget balance in 1990 was -4.1% 
which was reduced to -3.8% of the gross domestic product (GDP) by 1997.
  
110  Other successes 
regard gross foreign direct investment, which increased from .2% of the GDP in 1990 to 10.9% 
in 2001, and average annual GDP growth, which increased from 1% between 1980 and 1990 to 
2.1% between 1990 and 2001.111  However annual GDP growth, as Robert Mattes has noted, 
needed to be between 6 and 7 percent to curtail unemployment and end racial inequality.112
The question remains as to how the South African public views both economic 
performance and job creation during the first decade of democracy in South Africa.  In order to 
garner some insight concerning this question, a survey I conducted in 2009 asked 65 South 
African citizens over the age of 32 to evaluate the affectiveness of the government regarding 
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economic performance and job creation between 1994 and 2004.  As the statistics in Table 1 
show, results regarding overall economic performance vary.  
 
Table 1: Economic Performance 1994-2004  
  
 
With the inequality that continues to persist in South Africa, differing opinions on overall 
economic performance between 1994 and 2004 is understandable.  Indeed, an individual with 
adequate finances and a steady job between 1994 and 2004 is less likely to be critical of the 
economy than an unemployed individual in financial despair.  However, when a specific 
question concerning economic performance was asked far more congruent results were 
produced.  Table 2 presents the results in regards to employment/labor/job creation from 1994 to 
2004. 
 
Table 2: Employment/Labor/Job Creation 1994-2004  
  
  
Poor Unsatisfactory Fair Satisfactory Good 
7 8 25 16 9 
Poor Unsatisfactory Fair Satisfactory Good 
17 22 18 8 0 
 49 
 The statistics in Table 2 show that 60% of those polled believed the government 
performed at a poor or unsatisfactory level regarding job creation while only 12% believed the 
government performed satisfactorily.  The overwhelming percentage of South Africans who 
responded critically regarding job creation indicates that there is a consensus, which crosses both 
racial and class lines.  Thus, although the South African government attracted foreign investment 
the monetary influx failed to translate into enough new employment opportunities necessary to 
curb unemployment and reduce inequality.  The results from Table 2 indicate that these failures 
are understood by the South African public regardless of their specific financial situation. And 
considering the fact that ending poverty and reducing unemployment and inequality were two of 
the main platforms the ANC ran on in 1994, the period between 1994 and 2004 should be 
deemed as being unsuccessful.  
  
Education 
 
 
Education is the great engine of personal development. It is through education that the daughter 
of a peasant can become a doctor, that a son of a mineworker can become the head of the mine, 
that a child of farm workers can become the president of a great nation. 
                  -Nelson Mandela 
 
One of the main strategies used by the apartheid government to preserve both white 
dominance and the NP agenda centered on racially dividing the educational system of South 
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Africa.113  Like in most other aspects of society, education was racially separated with the 
passing of the Bantu Education Act (1953) and the Extension of University Act (1959).  
Specifically, the Bantu Education Act restructured the educational system so that: 1) African 
education was the responsibility of the Native Affairs Department instead of the Provincial 
Councils, which would still be responsible for the education of Europeans, Coloureds and 
Indians; and 2) churches and missionary groups would be relieved from their burden of 
educating the Bantu and that the Bantu would now be responsible for their own education.114  
Supporters of the act explained that placing the education of black children under African 
leadership would increase pride and subsequently the quality of education.  Contrastingly, 
detractors questioned how a largely illiterate segment of society could command a modern 
educational system without any transitionary period.115  Caught in the crosshairs, many Africans 
saw the act as it was, an attempt to “train the majority of African children for a position in life 
which has been assigned to them-an inferior status.”116
The Extension of University Act took the policies from the Bantu Education Act and 
carried them over to institutions of higher learning.  By extending a racially segregated 
educational system to the arena of higher learning, the apartheid government sought to limit 
black opposition by limiting the growth potential of educated black South Africans.  Indeed, the 
act ensured that “Black universities were established as teaching institutions intended to prepare 
graduates for entrance into the work force” while ensuring that “research activities were never 
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integrated into the mission of these universities.”117  In other words, the goal of black 
universities was to take intelligent and driven young black South Africans and mold them into 
obedient civil servants who would maintain peace in the homelands.118
Accordingly, following the end of apartheid many improvements were made in the 
educational system of South Africa.  These improvements undoubtedly stem from policies 
included in the Higher Education Act (1997) and the Green and White Papers (1997), as well as 
efforts made by the National Commission of Higher Education (NCHE).  Created in 1995, the 
NCHE was charged with the task of reconciling the racially divided educational system while 
modernizing the curriculum in order to prepare South Africans for the twenty-first century.
  While the passing of this 
act caused controversy regarding its true aim, much like the Bantu Education Act, there is little 
debate regarding the impact both acts had on South African society.  Indeed, during their 
existence white South Africans were provided far better education than coloured or Indian South 
Africans, who were provided far better education than black South Africans.  With the ANC 
victory in 1994, the remnants of this unequal system were expected to be washed away.  
119  
As a result of the aforementioned measures, the literacy rate steadily increased between 1994 and 
2004, as did the number of South Africans who pursued higher education.  The annual 2003 
World Bank report concluded that the adult illiteracy rate declined in South Africa from 19% in 
1990 to 14.5% in 2001.120
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at 81.4% in 1994.121  Subsequent UNDP reports released in 1999 and 2004 found that the 
literacy rate had increased in South Africa to 84% in 1997122 and 86% in 2002.123  Regarding 
higher education, many universities and colleges in South Africa have seen an increase in black 
student enrollment since 1994.  For instance, in 1999 the University of Port Elizabeth (UPE) 
reported a student body that was made up of 60% black students, a far cry from the less than 
10% black student enrollment during apartheid.124
However, many remnants of the past educational system continued to persist.  The Rand 
Afrikaans University (RAU) for example, continued to employ a predominantly white faculty 
despite holding a respected position in South Africa for its proactive multi-cultural policies.  In 
1999, black faculty members comprised only 9.5% of the total faculty, despite RAU having a 
51% black student body.
   
125
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  Furthermore, between 1994 and 2004 traditionally black universities 
continued to be provided less government funding than their white counterparts, such as the 
University of Cape Town and University of Stellenbosch.  Lastly, the educational system 
continued to be plagued by disputes regarding the restructuring of university curriculum.  
Supporters of traditional discourse, in which a student concentrates on one specific field or 
major, continually argued with those who called for the implementation of credit exchange or 
interdisciplinary discourse, in which a student picks and chooses classes based on individual 
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preference.  Caught in the middle, the NCHE did not firmly settle the dispute over curriculum 
and what constituted an academic program, leaving ambiguity in higher learning policy.  
Without concrete guidelines “different institutions invested these features [educational goals] 
with very different meanings.”126
 
  Indeed, the lack of consistency between institutions of higher 
learning is one of the main problems that continued to hinder the educational system of South 
Africa, as universities exploited ambiguous polices and interpreted them as they saw fit.  
Healthcare 
 
         In 1994 South Africa did not have a nationally uniformed healthcare system nor was there 
any semblance of cohesion among provinces to address nationwide problems such as HIV/AIDS.   
The lack of a nationally unformed healthcare system also caused South Africa to have gross 
disparities between regions regarding healthcare facilities and quality of service.  The 
government responded by adopting a national platform that sought to improve healthcare through 
specialization, which included the creation of pediatric, women’s health, and HIV/AIDS 
centers.127
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         The survey found that 75% of whites have access to government sponsored medical aid 
compared to only 8% of Africans.128  Furthermore, 12% of South Africans who went to a public 
health facility were dissatisfied with the quality of service compared to only 7% who went to a 
private facility, with 17.3% of the coloured populace and 14.4% of the urban black populace 
reporting dissatisfaction with public healthcare.129  Additionally, the annual 1998 report released 
by the UNDP found that “significant regional disparities persist in terms of access to basic health 
and welfare services” as for instance the “Northern Province has a population of 4.7 million 
people served by only 350 doctors and 240 social workers.”130
Another inadequacy in South African healthcare was the failure to curtail the rapid 
increase of HIV/AIDS between 1994 and 2004.  Indeed, the 1994 UNDP global report estimated 
that 1.7 out of every 100,000 (.0017%) South Africans had HIV/AIDS in 1992.
  These statistics suggest that there 
continued to be a racial and regional disparity in the quality of healthcare received.  Whether the 
racial disparity regarding the quality of healthcare was improved is unknown, as interestingly the 
2003 SADHS survey failed to acquire any information on the quality of healthcare in South 
Africa.  This discrepancy should not be overlooked and deemed as simply being an error as 
every other category included in the 1998 SADHS survey was included in the 2003 SADHS 
survey.  Rather it could be inferred that an underlying motivation for its absence was a failure to 
adequately address racial inequality regarding the quality of healthcare between 1998 and 2003. 
131
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WHO released an annual report estimating that 650,000 out of a total population of 41,465,000 
(1.56%) South Africans were infected with HIV or AIDS in 1996.132  The number of South 
Africans infected with HIV/AIDS rose dramatically in the years following these estimations.  For 
instance, a 2008 report released by the Joint United Nations Program on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) 
estimated that the total number of South Africans infected with HIV/AIDS had risen from 
650,000 in 1996 to 4,700,000 in 2001, an increase of over 4,050,000 cases.133  Considering the 
fact that the total population of South Africa in 2001 was estimated to be 43,200,000, the 
percentage of South Africans infected with HIV/AIDS had increased tenfold to roughly 10.9% in 
a span of five years.134  However, even more troubling was the increase of pregnant women 
infected with HIV/AIDS during this period.  According to Avert.org, the prevalence of pregnant 
women infected with HIV or AIDS in 1993 was 4.3%.  This percentage rose dramatically to a 
staggering 22.4% in 1999 and 27.9% in 2003.135
A main reason for the increased prevalence of HIV/AIDS in South Africa was the large 
discrepancy in HIV/AIDS knowledge.  Indeed, the 2003 SADHS survey concluded that 
knowledge and prevention of HIV fell along educational, racial and regional lines.  Specifically, 
the 2003 SADHS stated that “men and women who have no education exhibit considerably 
lower levels of knowledge of HIV and AIDS prevention than those with some education” while 
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“Asian and white respondents tend to be better informed about HIV prevention methods than 
African or coloured respondents.”136  A main causal factor for this discrepancy was that there 
was a lack of HIV/AIDS education in rural areas where HIV/AIDS is much more prevalent.  
Moreover, what information many Africans did receive about HIV prevention was not always 
accurate.  For instance, an educational play called Sarafina II, which was aimed at curbing the 
spread of HIV, contained numerous inaccuracies regarding the disease.  This caused AIDS 
activists to comment that “the play sent vague and confusing signals about the disease” including 
a scene when “one victim limps and walks doubled-over in the second act, symptoms not 
generally considered consequences of AIDS.”137  Another example of the dissemination of false 
information was when then ANC President Jacob Zuma stated that taking a shower after having 
unprotected sex prevented the transmission of HIV.138
 Lastly, healthcare shortcomings during this period do not end at the inability to curb the 
HIV/AIDS infection rate but also include the failure to reduce the infant mortality rate and 
increase life expectancy.  In regards to infant mortality, the annual 1996 WHO report concluded 
that the infant mortality rate in 1994 was 50 for every 1,000 live births.
  Undoubtedly, erroneous statements made 
by prominent figures such as these played a part in the steady increase of HIV/AIDS infections 
between 1994 and 2004.  
139
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concluded that the infant mortality rate had increased to 51 for every 1,000 live births in 2005.140  
The 1996 WHO report also determined that the average life expectancy for South Africans born 
in 1995 was 64.141  The 2007 WHO report found that this number had fallen dramatically to an 
average life expectancy of 51 for South Africans born in 2005.142
 
  Thus, due to inadequate 
funding of the healthcare sector between 1994 and 2004, the prevalence of HIV/AIDS increased 
exponentially, life expectancy decreased by over a decade, and the infant mortality rate increased 
by one. 
Human Development Index (HDI) 
 
 As previously noted, the decision by the ANC to adopt GEAR and fiscal conservatism 
meant that funding needed to improve the quality of life in South Africa would be limited.  
Resultantly, between 1994 and 2004 South Africa not only experienced a period of relative 
stagnation, but also a reduction in equality and quality of life.  This is clearly evident with the 
continual decline of South Africa’s Human Development Index (HDI).  The HDI, created by the 
United Nations to measure the development and equality of a specific country, measures and 
averages three components.  Respectively, these three components are: 1) income, 2) life 
expectancy at birth, and 3) educational attainment, which takes into account adult literacy and 
the combined primary, secondary and tertiary enrollment ratio.  In layman’s words, the HDI 
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estimates an individual’s “ability to lead a long and healthy life, the ability to be knowledgeable 
and the ability to have access to the resources needed for a decent standard of living.”143
 
  Thus, 
by analyzing several HDI ratings over an extended period of time, it is possible to see trends, 
either positive or negative, of a given country.  As presented in Figure 1, South Africa’s case 
from 1994 to 2004 was one of disappointment as the period saw the country continue along a 
negative path.     
 
Figure 1: Human Development Index of South Africa, 1994-2004 
Source: UNDP, Human Development Reports (1997, pp 147; 1999, pp 136; 2002, pp 155; 2005, 
225)  
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When Nelson Mandela and the ANC instilled democracy in South Africa in 1994, South 
Africa had an HDI of .716 and was ranked 90th in the world.144  Three years later this rating had 
fallen to .695 and South Africa dropped to a ranking of 101st in the world.145
When South Africa’s 2003 HDI is compared to its 2003 Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
per capita, the disparity in rank is -68.
  As noted in Figure 
1, the HDI leveled off and between 1997 and 2000 remaining at .695.  Although the HDI did not 
decline during this period of stagnation, South Africa’s world ranking dropped to 107th as other 
developing nations including El Salvador, Tunisia, and Algeria, surpassed South Africa.  
However, while the first six years following 1994 saw South Africa’s HDI drop by .021 and its 
world ranking fall by 17 positions, it was the period between 2000 and 2003 that saw the most 
dramatic decline.  Indeed, in 2005 the UN calculated that the HDI of South Africa in 2003 had 
fallen to .658, as the country dropped 13 positions to a 120th world ranking. Countries that 
overtook South Africa in the HDI world ranking between 2000 and 2003 included Bolivia, 
Nicaragua, and Guatemala.    
146  A -68 disparity means that South Africa’s GDP per 
capita was ranked 68 spots higher than its HDI ranking.  To put this statistic into perspective, in 
2003 South Africa had the third largest HDI/GDP discrepancy in the world, behind only 
Equatorial Guinea and Botswana. Comparatively, countries strife with civil unrest and turmoil in 
2003, such as Sierra Leone, Sudan, and Zimbabwe, had negative HDI/GDP disparities of -1, -6, 
and -20 respectively.147
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to be drastically unequal as “almost half of the country’s people live in poverty with access to 
neither money nor credit.”148
The decline of South Africa’s HDI and the increased levels of unemployment, poverty, 
and HIV/AIDS were negative developments that are important to take into account in order to 
fully understand the decline of political participation in South Africa.  Chapter Three presented 
these trends along with their respective sectors solely to accomplish this task and their inclusion 
was not aimed at being overly critical of the ANC or to suggest that South Africans lived a better 
life during apartheid.  The momentous steps forward made in the human rights sector, including 
the right to free speech and right to collectively organize, far outweigh any of the negative trends 
experienced between 1994 and 2004.  Every one of the improvements noted in Chapter Three, 
including the increase of black students enrolled in higher education, would never have been 
possible if apartheid had continued.  However, every one of the negative trends would have been 
exacerbated had apartheid not been dismantled.   
  Summarily, after the first decade of ANC-led democracy in South 
Africa its HDI decreased by .058, its world-ranking fell by 30 positions, and it had a HDI/GDP 
disparity indicative of being one of the most unequal countries in the world. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: POLITICAL CULTURE FROM 1994-2004 
 
As noted in the introduction, the first decade of democracy in post-apartheid South 
Africans saw: 1) the unification of civic associations and organizations under one body (Sanco), 
2) collusion between NGO’s that support procedural democracy and the ANC, and 3) numerous 
instances of floor crossing accompanied by large-scale corruption.  First, by unifying 
independent civic associations and organizations under Sanco, the ANC quelled oppositional 
support and reduced the number of political outlets previously accorded to South Africans.  
Subsequently, the decision to create a single national civic body, at both the local and national 
level, disillusioned the rural black populace and made participation in government and politics 
challenging for the common individual.149
While Sanco greatly limited mass political participation in South Africa, collusion by 
liberal NGO’s and the ANC sought to indoctrinate the remaining opposition to procedural 
democracy.
  In other words, the creation of Sanco made it much 
more difficult for South Africans to organize and collectively voice their frustration with 
government.   
150
                                                 
149 Zuern, “Fighting for Democracy,” 83. 
  Because the ANC originally campaigned and was elected under a platform 
proposing social democracy, which would increase the money earmarked for social and welfare 
programs, the South African government attempted to convince its populace that improvements 
experienced in the long-term via procedural democracy should take priority over any 
improvements felt in the short-term via social democracy.  A perfect example of this policy shift 
was the adoption of the economic policy GEAR, which was discussed in Chapter Three.   
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In addition to the creation of Sanco and allocation of financial support for liberal NGO’s, 
numerous instances of floor crossing also reinforced and preserved the dominant position held by 
the ANC.  As a result of these factors, between 1994 and 2004 fewer and fewer South Africans 
actively participated in politics.  In turn, the political culture went from being one that had mass 
political participation and an optimistic citizenry, to one of reduced political participation with a 
sizably disillusioned populace who feels its vote would not make a difference.151  This change in 
the South African political culture can be seen in the decline in political participation, as is 
evident when electoral poll results gathered by the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) are 
compared between 1994 and 2004.152
The IEC is a permanent organization that was created under provisions made in the 1993 
Constitution.  Its sole purpose is to ensure free and fair elections in South Africa and therefore 
operates independently from the South African government.  According to IEC electoral reports, 
19,533,498 South Africans voted in the 1994 national election.
  
153  However, the number of 
South Africans who voted in the 1999 election dropped significantly to 15,977,142-a decrease of 
3,556,656 votes or roughly 18%.154
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  This drop-off in political participation continued as 
evidenced by the lack of participation in the 2000 municipal election.  As stated in the 2000 
Voter Turnout Report, only 48.07% of the South African populace voted in the 2000 municipal 
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elections.155
The drop-off in political participation did not end in 2000 and continued to plague the 
South African political culture as indicated by a reduction in total votes garnered in the 2004 
elections.  This is especially troubling due to the fact that the reduction in political participation 
occurred despite South Africa possessing a larger populace eligible to vote and “a strenuous 
effort to increase the number of registered voters by the IEC” which included “incentives such as 
free identification books, an expansion of registration points, two major registration drives and 
continued registration at municipal offices.”
  The lack of voter turnout at the municipal level indicates that disillusionment 
spread from the upper echelon’s of politics down to the localities.  This is troubling because it 
suggests that South Africans believe that they not only had little control over national policies 
and politics but that they did not have control over decisions made at the micro level; in towns 
and cities.   
156  Indeed, although South Africa experienced 
significant population growth between 1994 and 2004, which stemmed from higher birth rates 
and an influx of immigrants from surrounding countries-notably Zimbabwe-only 15,863,558 
South Africans voted in the 2004 election-a decrease of 113,584 from the 1999 election.157
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oppositional political parties of seats that would have been accordingly allocated based on the 
number of votes attained.   
Results from a survey I conducted in South Africa mirrors the decline in political 
participation noted in the electoral polls.  The survey questioned 65 South Africans who were 
eligible to vote in both the 1994 and 2004 elections.  Out of the 65 South Africans polled, 9 
voted in 1994 but not in 2004.  Thus, roughly 14% of those polled failed to participate in the 
2004 election despite participating in the 1994 election.  While the specific reasons given for not 
voting in the 2004 election vary, there is a general overlap that notes the failure of government, 
in one aspect or another, as the primary reason.  
 For instance, several respondents explained that displeasure with post-apartheid social 
policies, specifically the lack or ineptitude of welfare programs created, was the reason they did 
not vote in 2004.  Other South Africans explained that post-apartheid economic policies and the 
subsequent economic recession forced them to seek employment outside of the country for 
subsistence; in turn lessening any motivation they had for political participation in South Africa.  
Lastly, some South Africans noted problems with the government itself, whether it be the fact 
that the ANC dominated politics between 1994 and 2004 or the crime and corruption in 
government that plagued the respective period.  In the following chapter, the specific responses 
given by participants will be presented in congruence with an overview of the various areas 
South Africans expressed concern with both between 1994 and 2004, as well as in the immediate 
future.  Respectively, these areas are: ANC dominance, crime and corruption in government, 
economic shortcomings, and lack of nationalism or shared national identity. 
 
 
 65 
ANC Dominance 
 
The dominant position held by the ANC between 1994 and 2004 is unarguable.  Amidst 
widespread criticism over its policies and corruption in government, the ANC maintained its 
stranglehold over South Africa, which was made possible through not only the creation of Sanco 
and support of liberal NGO’s, but the nature of proportional representation.  As previously noted, 
19,533,498 South Africans voted in the 1994 national election with the ANC receiving 62% of 
the total votes cast.158  Five years later the number of South Africans who participated in the 
1999 election and voted dropped to 15,977,142 with the ANC garnering 66% of the votes.159  
Thus, as the total number of South Africans who voted decreased, support for the ANC 
increased, in turn increasing the number of seats allocated to the ANC.  These figures indicate 
South Africans who supported or were affiliated with the ANC voted in the 1999 election, while 
South Africans who failed to vote were, for the most part, those who supported a different party.  
This trend continued as although only 15,863,558 South Africans voted in the 2004 election-a 
decrease of 113,584 from the 1999 election-the ANC obtained 69% of the total votes cast, an 
increase of 3%.160
Another main reason the ANC continued to strengthen its position in government 
between 1994 and 2004 was through the employment of floor crossing.  As previously 
mentioned, floor crossing refers to politicians switching political party affiliation once elected 
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into office.  While floor crossing provides standing politicians the opportunity to support newly 
created political parties, it also accords dominant parties the opportunity to lure politicians away 
from smaller parties with the promise of advancement and the benefits of membership.  Between 
1994 and 2004, the latter occurred more frequently as politicians from smaller parties 
dramatically altered their principles to conform to ANC platforms.161  Thus, in situations when 
floor crossing occurred, political parties that garnered enough support to elect a politician in 
office ended up losing its representation in government.  Moreover, not only did the party lose a 
seat in government but usually one of its leaders, which both strengthened the ANC and 
weakened the respective party.  As a result, floor crossing effected party representation in 
government which caused higher levels of voter apathy.162
 
  Table 3 presents the number of seats 
both lost and gained by each party as a result of floor crossing in 2002. 
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Table 3: Floor crossing Statistics for 2002 
 
Political Party # of Seats Gained # of Seats Lost Disparity 
Action Independent People’s Party 0 1 -1 
African Christian Democratic Party 2 4 -2 
Alliance 2000+ 0 1 -1 
Alliance for the Community 0 6 -6 
Alliance of Independents Midvaal 0 1 -1 
African National Congress 131 16 +115 
Azanian People’s Organisation 0 6 -6 
Belastingbetalersverining Van Parys 1 0 +1 
Black Consciousness Forum 5 0 +5 
Breedevallei Onafhanklik 1 2 -1 
Christian Democratic Party 5 0 +5 
Civic Alliance 0 1 -1 
Democratic Alliance 17 420 -403 
The Conservative Party of South Africa 2 0 +2 
East Rand Forum 0 2 -2 
Greater Brits Civic Organisation 0 1 -1 
George Community Initiative 0 3 -3 
Inkatha Freedom Party 9 10 -1 
Independents 19 7 +12 
Independent Civic Organisation of South Africa 0 2 -2 
Independent Heritage South Party 1 0 +1 
Independent Sport Party 1 0 +1 
Inwoners/Citizens’ Forum 0 1 -1 
 68 
Political Party # of Seats Gained # of Seats Lost Disparity 
Jansenville Klipplaat Alliansie 0 1 -1 
Kouga 2000+ 0 1 -1 
Middelburg Residents Organisation 0 1 -1 
Mosselbaai Gemeenskapsforum 0 1 -1 
Nasionale aksie 1 0 +1 
New National Party 356 0 +356 
Noordwes Forum 0 2 -2 
Oudtshoorn Aksie 2000 0 2 -2 
Pan Africanist Congress of Azania 0 12 -12 
People’s Forum 0 1 -1 
Phumelela Ratepayers’ Association 1 0 +1 
Postmasburg Olifantshoek Resident Association 0 4 -4 
Potchefstroom Inwonersvereniging 1 0 +1 
United Christian Democratic Party 1 25 -24 
United Democratic Movement 11 21 -10 
United Independent Front 0 1 -1 
Universal Party 1 0 +1 
Verenigde Gemeenskap Organisasie 0 1 -1 
Vision-Visie 2000+ 0 2 -2 
Vryheidsfront/Freedom Front 0 1 -1 
Witzenberg Onafhanklike Vereniging 0 1 -1 
Ximoko Party 0 4 -4 
Zimbambeleni Development Organisation 0 1 -1 
 
Source: IEC, Floor crossing Report, http:www.elections.org.za/papers/23/DetailedFCRpt.xls   
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  The column to the far right of Table 3 indicates the number of seats lost or gained by 
each party after floor crossing during the 2002 calendar year.  As shown in Table 3, the number 
of politicians who joined smaller parties, such as the Independent Sport Party and Phumelela 
Ratepayers’ Association, was far fewer than those who joined larger parties, like the ANC and 
NNP.  Subsequently, many smaller parties, including the Azanian People’s Organisation and 
Ximoko Party, lost numerous seats while failing to gain a single seat.  Indeed, in 2002 the ANC 
attracted more members due to floor crossing than all other parties combined with the exception 
of the NNP, which subsequently merged with the ANC in 2005.163
When the South African populace was presented with the opportunity to voice their 
opinion over the formal legalization of floor crossing in 2003, the populace voted 
overwhelmingly against its legalization.  However, despite a three to one popular vote opposing 
the legalization of floor crossing, the Constitutional Court passed the legislation, which promptly 
gave the ANC nine new members in Parliament and an overall majority in the National 
Assembly.
  
164
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  As a result of its formal legalization, floor crossing was not limited to the period 
1994-2003 and continued to play a large role in maintaining ANC dominance in government.  
For instance, a 2004 summary report released by the IEC concluded that the dominant political 
party in ten municipalities changed as a result of floor crossing.  While the ANC was the 
dominant party in none of the ten municipalities before floor crossing, it became the dominant 
party in eight of the ten municipalities after floor crossing.  Contrastingly, the NNP was the 
dominant party in five of the municipalities before floor crossing, four of which were taken over 
164 Bauer and Taylor, Politics in Southern Africa, 260. 
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by the ANC.165
However to what extent did ANC dominance in government contribute to dwindling 
political participation in South Africa?  Also, how concerned are South Africans regarding ANC 
dominance in government as it pertains to the acceptance and long-term survival of democracy in 
South Africa?  Results from a survey I conducted sought to provide insight into these questions 
and are presented in Table 4. 
  The loss of dominant positions, this time at the local level, was one of the main 
reasons the NNP merged with the ANC less than one year later.  Thus, floor crossing not only 
preserved ANC dominance, but led to the demise of a main oppositional party whose members 
chose to join the ANC instead of continue to fight it.   
 
Table 4: Concern over ANC Dominance 
 
No Concern     Minor Concern Moderate Concern Major Concern Immediate Concern 
6 3 12 25 19 
 
 
Evident in Table 4 is the fact that 67.7% of the South Africans polled believe ANC 
dominance is either an immediate or major concern regarding the long-term stability of 
democracy in South Africa.  While the sample size was somewhat numerically limited, a 
proportion over two-thirds is overwhelming enough to conclude that most South Africans believe 
ANC dominance to be a problem effecting the political culture of South Africa.  Furthermore, 
                                                 
165 IEC, Summary Report on Floor Crossing, 2004, 
http://www.elections.org.za/papers/130/Floor%20%Crossing%202004%20Results.xls, accessed 18 November 2008.  
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when South Africans who voted in 1994 but did not vote in 2004 were asked why they failed to 
vote, many provided an answer pointing towards ANC dominance.   
For instance, one respondent plainly stated “dominance of ANC” as the reason for not 
voting in 2004, while another individual noted being “not happy with floor crossing” as the 
reason for not voting.  These answers, although brief, clearly express displeasure with ANC 
dominance in government.  One answer given by a respondent who did not vote in 2004 was not 
brief and explicitly voiced disappointment with the ANC.  Specifically, the respondent stated “I 
had high hopes and aspirations of a change in government style. But the ANC’s apartheid is 
similar or even worse than the Nationalist apartheid.”  Lastly, one respondent explained the 
failure to vote in 2004 despite voting in 1994 was “because there was no party to vote for”, 
which alludes to the fact that the ANC is “progressively closing down opposition and building 
the foundations of a new authoritarianism.”166
 
  
Crime and Corruption 
 
 
 Due to the fact that the ANC comprised, and continues to comprise, the majority of 
positions in South Africa’s government, between 1994 and 2004 crime and corruption in 
government was closely tied with the ANC and its members.  A byproduct of this affiliation was 
the perception by the public that checks and balances were null in void, as it was viewed unlikely 
an oversight committee chaired and comprised of mostly ANC members would criticize or 
                                                 
 166 Butler, Contemporary South Africa, 119. 
 72 
question another ANC member.167  Indeed, the “ANC’s domination of the public sector calls into 
question the efficacy of governmental-oversight mechanisms.”168   This notion was reinforced, in 
part, by the case of Bantu Holomisa.  Holomisa, once a close friend and supporter of Nelson 
Mandela, was expelled from the ANC after speaking to the Truth and Reconciliation Committee 
(TRC) and discussing acts of corruption by ANC members.  Specifically, he mentioned then 
Minister of Public Enterprises Stella Sigcau, noting that she had received part of a $50,000 bribe 
to allow the construction of a casino and the granting of a casino license to Sol Kerzner.169
Another instance of corruption by a political official was an arms scandal involving then 
Deputy President Jacob Zuma and Schabir Shaik.  Shaik, a long-time friend and financial advisor 
to Zuma, pled guilty in 2005 for offering Zuma a 500,000 rand per year bribe for his silence 
during an investigation into a multibillion-rand arms deal involving Shaik’s company, Thint.
  The 
circumstances surrounding Holimisa’s dismissal stressed the extent to which South African 
politics had become corrupted and the length the ANC would go to close ranks.   
170  
Shaik also pled guilty to making 238 payments between 1995 and 2002 to Zuma, in the sum of 
over 1,300,000 rand, so he could use his name and political influence for business purposes.171
                                                 
 167 New York Times (New York), 10 May 1999. 
  
However, despite Shaik pleading guilty to both charges and the prosecution holding an encrypted 
fax that detailed corrupt payments between the parties involved, Jacob Zuma was not convicted 
of any offense.  Any opportunity for a conviction ended when the National Prosecutorial 
168 Kenneth R. Dombrowski, “South Africa After Apartheid,” Journal of Democracy 17, no. 3 (July 2006): 
43-57.  
 
 169 New York Times (New York), 2 September 2006. 
170 The Star (Johannesburg), 16 May 2006. 
 171 Cape Times (Cape Town), 21 June 2005. 
 73 
Authority (NPA) dropped corruption charges on 6 April 2009, which followed Zuma’s election 
as president of South Africa.  The decision by the NPA to drop the charges against Zuma, in the 
words of former South African president F.W. de Klerk, raises “serious questions regarding the 
NPA’s independence and whether all South Africans are still equally treated before the law.”172
 Examples of crime and corruption in government between 1994 and 2004 were not 
limited to these two aforementioned incidences.  In 2000, former cabinet minister Abe Williams 
was convicted of stealing 383,000 rand in donations and former ambassador Allan Boesek was 
convicted of stealing donor funds of an undisclosed amount.
 
173  Another instance of corruption 
centered on Tony Yengeni, who in 2003 was convicted of defrauding parliament by failing to 
disclose a 47% discount (worth R167 387) on a Mercedes-Benz ML 320 4x4 he bought in 
1998.174  The case of Yengeni is not unique as many cases of corruption stem from politician’s 
desire to drive luxury cars, including the Mercedes-Benz brand.175  Indeed, ANC leaders have 
been known to recklessly drive around Durban in luxury cars and constantly party at five-star 
hotels.176
                                                 
 172 The Star (Johannesburg), 7 April 2009. 
  While these examples of corruption are troubling it is the cases of Bantu Holomisa and 
Jacob Zuma which are particularly disturbing cases due to their implication of prominent figures 
in South African politics.  The inclusion of Jacob Zuma alone, clearly presents the extent to 
which crime and corruption was, and continues to be, embedded in South Africa’s government.  
With this considered, to what extent did crime and corruption in government effect political 
 173 The Star (Johannesburg), 21 March 2003. 
 174 The Mercury (Durban), 20 March 2003. 
 175 The Mercury (Durban), 20 March 2003. 
 176 Johannesburg Sunday Times (Johannesburg), 21 November 2006. 
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participation in South Africa?  In order to answer this question, several indicators will be used 
including the Global Corruption Barometer (GCB), Corruption Perception Index (CPI), and the 
Global Integrity Index (GII).  Lastly, survey data will be used to buttress these sources and 
provide additional insight into the problem of crime and corruption along with its impact on 
South Africa’s political culture between 1994 and 2004.  
  The GCB is a public opinion survey that collects data by randomly surveying citizens of 
each country polled.  Contrastingly, the CPI and GII collect information and opinions from 
carefully selected researchers and journalists within each country.  Thus, by combining these 
sources it is possibly to attain an accurate overview, which encompasses input from all societal 
and educational levels, of the role crime and corruption played in reducing political participation 
in South Africa. 
 Because understanding why there was a decline in political participation by the general 
populace in South Africa between 1994 and 2004 is the main focus of this thesis, the GCB will 
be presented first.  Created by Transparency International (TI) as a supplement to the CPI, which 
TI created in 1995, the initial GCB was released in 2003.  In this report, when 465 South African 
respondents were asked to approximate the degree corruption affected their political life, in other 
words political participation, troubling results were produced.  Specifically, 304 (65.4%) South 
Africans said corruption in government very significantly affected their political life in South 
Africa.177
                                                 
 177 Transparency International (TI), the Transparency International Global Corruption Barometer: A 2002 
Pilot Survey of International Attitudes, Expectations, and Priorities on Corruption, (London: Transparency 
International, 2003), 24.  
  Additionally, 106 (22.8%) said corruption somewhat significantly affected their 
political life, with only 55 (11.8%) noting that their political life was not significantly affected by 
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corruption.178  When 498 South Africans were asked the degree to which they believed 
corruption would increase or decrease in South Africa during the next three years, 180 (36.1%) 
said it would increase a lot, 73 (14.7%) said it would increase a little, and 67 (13.5%) said it 
would remain status quo.179
 Similar results were evident in the 2003 CPI.  The CPI, which was developed by TI, 
released its first report in 1995.  Beginning in 1995, the CPI index has calculated corruption in 
government by rating each nation on a scale from zero to ten, with zero standing as very corrupt 
and ten as highly clean.  Included in the initial 1995 CPI, South Africa received a 5.62 score and 
was ranked 21st out of the 41 countries polled.
   
180  However, while South Africa’s CPI minimally 
increased to 6.58 in 1996, it gradually followed a negative trend bottoming out at 4.4 in 2003, 
when it was ranked 48th out of the 133 countries polled.181
 
  Presented in Figure 2 is South 
Africa’s CPI from 1995 to 2004. 
                                                 
 178 TI, the Transparency International Global Corruption Barometer, 24. 
 
 179 TI, the Transparency International Global Corruption Barometer, 28.   
 180 TI, Corruption Perception Index, (Berlin: TI, 1995), 5. 
 181 TI, Corruption Perception Index, (Berlin: TI, 2003), 4.  
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Figure 2: Corruption Perception Index of South Africa, 1995-2004 
Source: Transparency International, CPI (1995, 1998, 2001, 2004), 
http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi  
 
  
 Finally, the Global Integrity Index (GII) reinforces the fact that corruption in South 
Africa has had a negative impact on politics and political participation.  Created by Global 
Integrity, a non-profit organization that seeks to evaluate and report on corruption in government 
worldwide, the GII combines ratings received from carefully selected researchers and journalists.  
Ratings range from 0 to 1; with 0 serving as poor and 1 as exceptional.  In the 2004 Global 
Integrity Report, South Africa received exceptional scores for freedom of the media (.92), civil 
society organizations (1), and election monitoring agencies (.95).182
                                                 
 182 Global Integrity (GI), Global Integrity Report: South Africa, (Washington D.C.: GI, 2004), 2. 
  However, while the 
electoral process and electoral oversight committee (IEC) received admiral marks, among many 
other categories, its political party finances rating was abysmal, receiving a score of .06.  
Political party finances refer to the financial equality between political parties both large and 
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small, at both the national and local level.  A poor rating in this category infers: 1) that there is 
no regulation on funds received by political parties nor is there a requirement to disclose donors 
and thus, 2) the procurement of finances is suspect and/or corrupt.  Furthermore, the report stated 
that “the lack of regulation on private and foreign funding is one of the greater dangers to our 
[South Africa] democracy, both in terms of the integrity of political outcomes and in terms of 
levels of corruption.”183
 Feedback from a survey I conducted indicates that the South African populace views 
crime and corruption in government as the primary concern regarding the long-term stability of 
democracy in South Africa.  This is clearly presented in Table 5, which contains a break down of 
65 South Africans surveyed on the level of concern crime and corruption poses democracy. 
  Thus, despite an overall GII rating of .81, the Global Integrity Report 
details a very unequal and corrupt component in South African politics. 
 
Table 5: Concern over Crime and Corruption 
 
No Concern Minor Concern Moderate Concern Major Concern Immediate Concern 
2 3 5 14 41 
 
  
  
 As is evident in Table 5, 41 of the 65 South Africans surveyed, roughly 63%, believed 
that crime and corruption in government is an immediate concern to the long-term stability of 
democracy in South Africa.  The concern South Africans have regarding crime and corruption is 
                                                 
 183 GI, Global Integrity Report: South Africa, 24. 
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magnified when immediate concern is combined with those who believe crime and corruption is 
a major concern.  The sum, 55, is roughly 85% of the 65 South Africans polled.  Regarding the 
South Africans who voted in 1994 but not in 2004, none expressed that crime and corruption 
itself was the reason for not voting.  However, one respondent who did not vote in either election 
stated a lack of confidence in the practices of political officials.  Specifically, the individual 
stated that “I wasn’t confident about the governing party and the competitors,” or in other words, 
South African politics.  Thus, when the survey data and newspaper articles are combined with 
the GCB, CPI, and GII, it is apparent that crime and corruption in South Africa played the largest 
role in the decline of political participation between 1994 and 2004.      
 
Economic Shortcomings 
 
As discussed in Chapter Three, although South Africa’s economy improved between 
1994 and 2004, it did not improve nearly to the extent necessary to curtail unemployment and 
widespread poverty.  While direct foreign investment increased formal employment positions, 
the number of jobs created was overshadowed by population growth and an influx of immigrants 
from neighboring countries in southern Africa.  Compounding this problem is the fact that the 
ANC failed to adequately provide and fund welfare programs necessary to affectively help 
impoverished South Africans.  However, it is unclear as to: 1) the extent economic shortcomings 
contributed to declining political participation in South Africa and 2) the level of concern South 
Africans have regarding the economies role in the long-term stability of democracy in South 
Africa.  Figure 2 presents the results from 65 South Africans presented with these questions.      
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Table 6: Concern over Economic Shortcomings 
 
No Concern Minor Concern Moderate Concern Major Concern Immediate Concern 
5 5 19 24 12 
    
  
 As displayed in Figure 2, 36.9% of the South Africans polled believed that economic 
shortcomings are a major concern for the long-term stability of democracy in South Africa.  
Additionally, 55.4% of those polled believed that economic shortcomings were either an 
immediate or major concern for the long-term stability of democracy in South Africa.  
Contrastingly, only 15.4% of those polled believed that economic shortcomings are of little or no 
concern to the long-term stability of democracy in South Africa.  These statistics clearly indicate 
that the majority of South Africans believe economic shortcomings are a concern for the long-
term stability of democracy in South Africa.   
 Regarding the role economic shortcomings played in the decline of political participation 
in South Africa, several survey participants provided insightful comments.  For instance, one 
participant stated that the failure to vote in 2004, despite voting in 1994, was because the 
participant “moved to UK to find work.” Another participant stated that he or she “was living in 
SA in 1994 and felt passionate about contributing to the right outcome.”  Lastly, one respondent 
noted a “lack of progress in black empowerment” which refers to the failure of government to 
bridge the financial gap between races   From these statements it is obvious that these South 
Africans were not politically active because they were either forced to find employment outside 
of South Africa and thus have less of a vested interest in South Africa’s political situation, or are 
dissatisfied with the economic progress of black South Africans.  Specifically, the second quote 
 80 
notes feeling passionate in the past tense, which suggests that the passionate feeling no longer 
exists.  Thus, for some South Africans who were forced to find employment outside of South 
Africa or are displeased with economic progress, economic shortcomings played a role in their 
lack of political participation in South Africa.   
 
Lack of Nationalism 
 
 A main theme that has remained constant in South African society since the arrival of 
Europeans is the lack of unity between classes, and more notably, races.  As presented in Chapter 
Two, South African society has a longstanding history of being fragmented; whether between the 
British and Boers, upper-class parties like the UP or the ANC-in its early years-and both parties 
lower-class constituents, or between black and white, African and European.  The complexity of 
this racial and class history made it all the more important that, for the successful and long-term 
stability of democracy and mass political participation, a shared national identity emerged in 
South African society.  One step taken by the government to increase the likelihood of this 
happening was the through the creation of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC).  
The TRC was a commission that invited participants from both sides in the struggle over 
apartheid to openly testify about their involvement, whether as perpetrators, as victims, or in 
many cases both.  It was hoped that by airing past atrocities the tensions embedded in South 
African society would be lessened so that the unification of the populace could occur.184
                                                 
 184 André de Toit, “Experiments with Truth and Justice in South Africa: Stockenström, Gandhi, and the 
TRC,” Journal of South African Studies 31, no. 2 (June 2005): 437. 
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 Perpetrators who testified before the TRC were not promised amnesty simply because of 
his or her admittance to criminal actions; amnesty was conditional.  Victims who testified gave 
up the right to pursue legal actions; the TRC decided what reparations would be awarded, if any.  
However, some critics argued that by focusing on attaining testimonies from specific individuals 
the TRC limited participation in the hearings to political activists and former apartheid agents, 
not society as a whole.185
 Resultantly, in a speech given on 28 November 2006, Executive Director of the Human 
Sciences Research Council on Social Cohesion and Identity Research for South Africa Xolela 
Mangcu, stressed South Africa remains, to its detriment, racially divided.  Specifically, he 
believed that South Africans allied along racial lines instead based on politics and ideology.  
Arguing that the ANC is responsible for the lack of unification due to its adherence to only its 
black constituency, Mangcu called for the ANC to  “invite the broader public to be part of its 
family” and embrace “the irreducible plurality of all societies.”
  Another criticism of the TRC centered on its position as an 
independent commission-separate from the government-which rendered it unable to directly 
prosecute noted perpetrators and provide the justice many South Africans wanted.  Thus, 
although the TRC was successful in airing many past human rights violations, it was unable to 
prosecute former perpetrators, provide the justice necessary to heal past wounds, and set the 
stage necessary to unify South African society.        
186
                                                 
 185 Mahmood Mamdani, “Amnesty or Impunity? A Preliminary Critique of the Report of the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission of South Africa (TRC),” Diacritics 32, no. 4 (Winter 2002): 34. 
   One example that suggested 
South Africa continued to be racially divided-with the ANC only assisting its black constituents-
was when the premier of Gauteng visited a mixed-race township called Eldorado Park in 2003.  
 
 186 Cape Times (Cape Town), 30 November 2006.  
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The citizens of Eldorado Park inquired as to why several years of electric debt accumulated by 
citizens of Soweto, a black township, had been written off, while the same accordance had not 
been provided to them despite Eldorado Park being in the same financial situation as Soweto.  
Specifically, the mixed-race citizens of Eldorado Park “wanted to know whether the government, 
now run by black people, was practicing reverse racism” and felt like “there is no place for them 
in the New South Africa.”187
  Reinforcing these comments, another newspaper article detailed that South Africans 
decisions and responses “continue to be clouded by the colours we support” and not “the general 
good of all the people”
  
188
  
  The date these statements were made reflect that racial division 
continued to persist in South Africa for the duration of the period between 1994 and 2004, and at 
least up until 2006 there was a lack of a shared national identity.  The extent that a lack of shared 
national identity is of concern to the long-term stability of democracy in South Africa is 
presented in Table 7.   
Table 7: Concern over Lack of Shared National Identity 
 
No Concern Minor Concern Moderate Concern Major Concern Immediate Concern 
6 16 15 20 8 
 
  
                                                 
 187 New York Times (New York), 27 July 2003. 
 188 Cape Argus (Cape Town), 9 October 2006. 
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 In contrast to the other areas of concern analyzed in this thesis (ANC dominance, crime 
and corruption in government, and economic shortcomings), lack of a shared national identity 
ironically produced an even distribution that follows a bell curve centering on moderate concern.  
This is ironic because the only prompt that produced a bell curve regards a topic that stresses the 
disunity prevalent in South Africa.  While the highest number of South Africans (20) chose 
major concern, this grouping was balanced by those South Africans who selected minor concern 
(16) which received the second highest number of votes.  Additionally, South Africans who 
selected immediate concern (8) were balanced by those who selected no concern (6).  
Furthermore, none of the South Africans surveyed who voted in 1994 but not in 2004 noted a 
lack of a shared national identity as their reason for not being politically active.  Thus, regarding 
lack of a shared national identity as a cause for the reduction in political participation-and the 
deterioration of the once politically active South African political culture-results from the survey 
vary and are thus inconclusive.    
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CHAPTER FIVE:  CONCLUSION 
 
 
Between 1994 and 2004 the political culture in South Africa saw a steady decline in 
political participation as satisfaction with the South African government deteriorated causing 
widespread disillusionment.  This is evident not only via the decline in voter turnout recorded by 
the IEC but by the numerous statements given by South Africans attesting to why the given 
individual did not vote in 2004 despite voting in 1994.  As was noted, there were numerous 
troubling developments that explain the decline in political participation.  Unemployment 
significantly increased in South Africa between 1994 and 2004 because work programs were not 
developed and implemented.  In turn, poverty increased as welfare spending was cut due to the 
adherence of the ANC to procedural democracy, a decision aimed at attracting direct foreign 
investment while limiting fiscal spending.  Together, these economic developments widened the 
gap between the marginalized-unemployed proletariat and the bourgeoisie.  Furthermore, the 
percentage of South Africans infected with HIV/AIDS increased as well, due to flawed 
educational programs including Sarafina II, and the varying standards of healthcare provided to 
South Africans based on class and race.  
Amidst these developments several decisions made political participation in South Africa 
difficult for those opposed to the ANC.  This includes the unification of civic associations under 
Sanco; the funding of liberal NGO’s to speak out against social democracy while advocating 
procedural democracy; and the legalization of floor crossing despite overwhelming public 
opposition.  Lastly, South Africans were made aware of numerous instances of crime and 
corruption committed by politicians in high-ranking positions.  Newspaper articles pointed out 
time and again the fact that many politicians embezzled money or accepted bribes during a time 
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when unemployment and poverty was increasing in South Africa.  However, discerning what 
factor is most responsible for the decline in political participation was difficult as each is 
troubling in its own right.  The survey I conducted sought to provide some insight and produced 
conclusive results. 
As presented in Chapter Four, the South African populace believes that crime and 
corruption in government is the main reason there was a decline in political participation 
between 1994 and 2004.  The surveys also clearly show that crime and corruption in government 
is of most concern to the long-term stability of democracy in South Africa.  Closely following 
crime and corruption in government was ANC dominance, which continued between 1994 and 
2004 due to Sanco, liberal NGO’s, and floor crossing.  However, it can be inferred that crime 
and corruption of a government dominated by one-party, the ANC, allows these two categories 
to be combined.  Indeed, the reason crime and corruption is a separate category is the fact that 
other parties occupied positions in government; although the likelihood that a member from a 
smaller party would risk losing his or her position by participating in crime or corruption, amidst 
the eyes of oversight committees dominated by members of the ANC, is limited. 
Economic shortcomings had an impact on political participation as well, due to many 
South Africans leaving the country to work abroad.  While these individuals continued to live 
part-time in South Africa, their exposure to other countries lessened the vested interest they had 
in South Africa.  Furthermore, the failure to properly address unemployment and poverty 
undoubtedly played a major role in the decline of political participation between 1994 and 2004.   
The one factor that was inconclusive was the role the lack of a shared national identity played in 
lessening political participation and the concern it is to the long-term stability of democracy.  
What is conclusive is that South Africa continued to be drastically unequal and at the end of the 
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first decade of democracy had become one of the most unequal countries in the world.  Thus, 
while some accomplishments were made between 1994 and 2004, they were overshadowed by 
the numerous failures that arose during this period.  Indeed, countless South Africans explained 
that in some ways life was far worse in 2004 than it was in 1994; higher levels of unemployment 
and poverty overwhelming points to these sentiments being valid.       
 
 
 87 
APPENDIX A: IRB APPROVAL 
 88 
 
 
 89 
APPENDIX B: SURVEY 
 90 
 
 
 91 
 
 
 92 
APPENDIX C: INFORMED CONSENT 
 93 
 
 94 
 
 95 
LIST OF REFERENCES 
 
Andreassson, Stefan. 2006. The African National Congress and its Critics: ‘Predator Liberalism’  
Black Empowerment and Intra-Alliance Tensions in Post-Apartheid South Africa. 
Democratization 13, no. 2: 303-322. 
 
Bauer, Gretchen, and Scott D. Taylor. 2005. Politics in Southern Africa. London: Lynne  
 Rienner Publishers. 
 
Beck, Roger. 2000.  The history of South Africa.  Westport, Conn: Greenwood Press. 
 
Butler, Anthony. 2004. Contemporary South Africa. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
Crais, Clifton C. 1992. White Supremacy and Black Resistance in Pre-Industrial South  
 Africa. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Davenport, T.R.H., and Christopher Saunders. 2000. South Africa: A Modern History. 
 New York: St. Martin’s Press. 
 
Dombroski, Kenneth R. 2006. South Africa After Apartheid.  Journal of Democracy 17, no. 3:  
 43-57. 
 
Ensor, Paula. 2004. Contesting Discourses in Higher Education Curriculum Restructuring in  
 South Africa. Higher Education 48, no. 3: 339-359. 
 
Etherington, Norman. 2001. The Great Trek: The Transformation of Southern Africa,  
 1815-1854. London: Longman Publishers, 2001. 
 
Fynn, Henry F. 1950. The Diary of Henry Francis Fynn. Pietermaritzburg, ZA: Shuter  
 and Shooter. 
 
Glaser, Daryl. 2001. Politics and Society in South Africa. London: Sage Publications. 
 
Hearn, Julie. 2000. Aiding Democracy? Donors and Civil Society in South Africa. Third  
 World Quarterly 21, no. 5: 815-830.  
 
________.  2001. The ‘Uses and Abuses’ of Civil Society in South Africa. Review of African 
 Political Economy, no. 87: 43-53. 
 
Hendricks, Fred. 2003. Fault-Lines in South African Democracy: Continuing Crises of  
 Inequality and Injustice. Uppsala, ZA: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet. 
 
 96 
Inter-Ministerial Committee for Poverty and Inequality. 1998. Report prepared for the Office of 
 the Executive Deputy President and the Inter-Ministerial Committee for Poverty and 
 Inequality.  
 
Johnston, Alexander. 1999. The 1999 Election and South Africa’s Postapartheid Political  
 Culture. Issue: A Journal of Opinion 27, no. 2: 17-23. 
 
Keegan, Timothy. 1996. Colonial South Africa and the Origins of the Racial Order. 
 Charlottesville, VA: University Press of Virginia. 
 
Kunnie, Julian. 2000. Is Apartheid Really Dead: Pan-Africanist Working Class Cultural  
 Critical Perspectives. Oxford: Westview Press. 
 
Kuper, Leo. 1957. Passive Resistance in South Africa. New Haven, Conn: Yale University    
 Press. 
 
de Kiewiet, C.W. 1937. The Imperial Factor in South Africa. London: Frank Cass &  
 Company Ltd. 
 
Laband, John. 2005. The Transvaal Rebellion. Harlow, UK: Pearson Longman  
 Publishers. 
 
Lester, Alan. 1996. From Colonization to Democracy: A New Historical Geography of  
 South Africa. New York: St. Martin’s Press. 
 
Mabokela, Reitumetse Obakeng, and Kimberly Lenease King, eds. 2001. Apartheid No More:  
 Case Studies of Southern African Universities in the Process of Transformation.  
 Westport, CT: Bergin and Garvey.   
 
Mamdani, Mahmood. 2002. Amnesty or Impunity? A Preliminary Critique of the Report of the 
 Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa (TRC). Diacritics 32, no. 4: 33-59. 
  
Mattes, Robert. 2002. South Africa: Democracy Without the People. Journal of  
 Democracy 13, no. 1: 22-36. 
 
Maylam, Paul. 2001. South Africa’s Racial Past: The history and historiography of  
 racism, segregation, and apartheid. Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing. 
 
McKinley, Dale T. 1997. The ANC and the Liberation Struggle. London: Pluto Press. 
 
Meli, Francis. 1989. South Africa Belongs to Us. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University      
 Press. 
 
Merwe, P.J. 1995. The Migrant Farmer in the History of the Cape Colony 1657- 
 1842. Athens, OH: Ohio University Press. 
 
 97 
Morris, Donald. 1965. The Washing of the Spears. New York: Simon and Schuster. 
 
Nattrass, Nicoli, and Jeremy Seekings. 2005. Class, Race, and Inequality in South Africa.  
 New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. 
 
 
Nutting, Anthony. 1970. Scramble for Africa: The Great Trek to the Boer War. London:  
 Constable & Company Ltd. 
 
Posel, Deborah. The making of Apartheid 1948-1961. New York: Oxford University  
     Press. 
 
Ridgeway, J. West. 1907. The Future of the Transvaal. Journal of the Royal African  
 Society 6, no. 22: 154-162. 
 
Robinson, Ronald, ed. 1988. Bismarck, Europe, and Africa: The Berlin Africa  
Conference 1884-1885 and the Onset of Partition. New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
Shaw, William. 1972. The journal of William Shaw. Cape Town, ZA: A. A. Balkema. 
 
Shepherd, R. H. W. 1955. The South African Bantu Education Act. African Affairs 54, no. 215:  
 138-142.  
 
Terreblanche, Sampie. 2002. History of Inequality in South Africa, 1652-2002.  
 Pietermaritzburg, ZA: University of Natal Press. 
 
Thomas, Scott. 1996. The Diplomacy of Liberation: the Foreign relations of the ANC  
      since 1960. New York: St. Martin’s Press. 
 
de Toit, André. 2005. Experiments with Truth and Justice in South Africa: Stockenström, 
 Gandhi, and the TRC. Journal of South African Studies 31, no. 2: 419-448. 
 
United Nations. 1976. Special Committee against Apartheid. Special Report of the Special 
 Committee against Apartheid on “The Soweto massacre and its aftermath. 
 
________. 1984. Special Committee against Apartheid. Appeal by the Special Committee against 
 Apartheid to the cities of the world. 
 
________. 1984. World Conference on Sanctions against Racist South Africa. Declaration 
 adopted by the World Conference on Sanction against Racist South Africa. 
 
UNAIDS. 2008. 2008 Report on the Global AIDS Epidemic. 
 
UNDP. 1995. Human Development Report 1995: Gender and Human Development. 
 
________. 1997. Human Development Report 1997: Human Development to Eradicate Poverty. 
 98 
 
________. 1998. HIV/AIDS & Human Development: South Africa. 
 
________. 1999. Human Development Report 1999: Globalization with a Human Face. 
 
________. 2000. South Africa: Transformation for Human Development. 
 
________. 2003. South Africa: the Challenge of Sustainable Development. 
 
________. 2004. Human Development Report 2004: Cultural Liberty in Today’s Diverse World. 
 
WHO. 1996. The World Health Report 1996: Fighting Disease, Fostering Development. 
 
________. 2007. The World Health Report 2007-A Safer Future: Global Public Health Security 
 in the 21st Century. 
 
World Bank. 2003. 2003 World Development Indicators. 
 
 Zuern, Elke. 2002. Fighting for Democracy: Popular Organizations and Postapartheid  
 Government in South Africa. African Studies Review 45, no. 1: 77-102. 
 
